Analysis of The Battle of France Using
The Art Of War by Sun Tzu and The Nine Principles of War
by
Daniel
Analysis of The Battle of France Using Sun Tzu’s The Art of War
Calculations: Chapter one of Sun Tzu’s The Art Of War sets the scene for the rest of the book, introducing the concepts of the Way, the sky, the earth, command, and method, and how to use what they entail to compare opposing forces.[1]
The German invasion of France in May of 1940 demonstrated many of the traits specified in the first chapter of Sun Tzu’s The Art Of War. Maurice Gamelin, commander in chief of the French Army during the opening phases of the Battle of France, had no desire to attack the Germans, and the French tactical and operational concepts were outdated.[2] The German commanders, in contrast, particularly Heinz Guderian, Erwin Rommel, Fedor von Bock, Erich von Manstein, and Gerd von Rundstedt, were effective and skilled commanders. Guderian with XIX Panzer Corps and Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division crossed the Meuse River and the Ardennes woods and launched a powerful drive across France.[3] Hitler was afraid of the advance being broken due to its rapid pace and issued a halt order, which infuriated Guderian. Guderian took initiative and continued his advance westward.[4]
The Wehrmacht was equipped with contemporary weaponry and utilized modern doctrine, for example placing its tanks into panzer corps. The French contrasted this with outdated tactics and, for example by dispersing their tanks in small numbers and treating the Ardennes as an impasse to the German advance, which it was not. While soldiers on both sides fought hard, the French operational structure was inferior to that of the Germans. Germany was in accordance with Calculations, chapter one of The Art Of War.
Starting a Battle: Chapter two of The Art Of War discusses the costs of a campaign, and to minimize them by achieving a “speedy victory” while also using captured resources to supply a conquering army.[5]
The German Army’s rapid advance overran the French, avoided the Stellungskrieg (positional warfare) of World War One, and instead engaged in a version of Bewegungskrieg (maneuver warfare) augmented by modern technology, where armor and aircraft create a gap in the enemy lines, which is then widened using mechanized and motorized units.[6] By keeping the invasion swift and dedicated, the German commanders kept down the costs of the campaign by avoiding Stellungskrieg. The Wehrmacht also used the resources captured in France, such as iron ore, to fuel the war effort.[7] The German invasion of France was in accordance with Starting a Battle, chapter two of The Art Of War.
Planning an Attack: Chapter three of The Art Of War says that ideally the enemy is defeated without fighting, how to divide forces based on their size, how a ruler can endanger his army, and what is entailed in knowing how to win.[8]
In terms of divisions, the German and French armies were approximately equal. However, the French forces were poorly deployed and using outdated tactical and operational concepts.[9] The Ardennes woods were almost entirely unguarded, and the French possessed no reserves to counterattack with.[10] The German generals were capable and effective in leading their men.[11] The French doctrine lacked flexibility and the ability to respond quickly to the enemy, limiting its versatility.[12] The French did not know themselves or their enemy, the Wehrmacht, which led to the Fall of France. The French defenders were in violation of Planning an Attack, chapter three of The Art Of War.
Form: Chapter four of The Art Of War explains that one must first build a unbreakable defense, and then wait for the enemy to expose a vulnerability before striking, and to have victory assured before doing battle.[13]
Following the winter of 1939-40, France had significant vulnerabilities in its defense, which Germany exploited during the Battle of France.[14] The Germans attacked through the lightly defended Ardennes. The German invasion plan made the assumptions that the French would not defend the Ardennes, would weakly defend the Meuse, would move their forces into Belgium, and have no reserves to counter the German breakthrough.[15] Luckily for Germany, France played into these assumptions and was in violation of Form, chapter four of The Art Of War. Germany was not perfectly aligned with Form, however, the French failed at taking advantage of the German gamble, negating the weaknesses in the German plan.
Circumstance: Chapter five of The Art Of War explains that warfare can only be regular or irregular. By having a strong force of circumstance and by exhibiting brief restraint, one can use the endless variations of regular and irregular warfare to achieve victory.[16]
Germany had a strong force of circumstance, they had to maintain their momentum and overrun the Allies without giving them the time to respond.[17] Germany utilized efficient variations of regular warfare, combined with their new methods of warfare, such as the glider assault on the Belgian fortress of Eben Emael or the use of panzer divisions to penetrate and break-up enemy lines and then exploit the opportunities created.[18] The French forces were disadvantaged by their doctrine, which lacked flexibility and was consequently slow to adapt to changing conditions.[19] The Allied reluctance to attack meant that they would not have the same drive as the German forces when they met in battle, which would end with the catastrophic Fall of France.[20] France was in violation of Circumstance, chapter five of The Art Of War, while Germany was in accordance with it.
The Empty And The Solid: Chapter six of The Art Of War tells of how to create a position of dominance over the enemy no matter their number by utilizing terrain and becoming unpredictable, and the advantages of having a concentrated force.[21]
Germany used concentrated panzer corps in the 1940 invasion of France, while the French Army dispersed its tanks throughout its ranks. This allowed the German offensive to tear through the French defenses, which were rushed and unprepared for the German invasion. The French decided to move their central reserve away from the Ardennes and instead positioned it to link with Holland, leaving the Ardennes open.[22] Germany caught the French by surprise, and the French forces were beaten back to the Channel. The German offensive was solid, while the French defense was empty, as in The Empty And The Solid, chapter six of The Art Of War.
Armies Contending: Chapter seven of The Art Of War discusses the difficulties of competing armies, the penalties of overextending your forces to contend for an advantage, and how to contend for an advantage deceptively.[23]
Germany was prepared to launch an invasion in 1940, and when they did the French were scrambling to try to defend. The Germans took advantage of the French disarray and crushed their forces with a powerful drive towards the English Channel.[24] Germany secured the advantage using an aggressive drive with its panzer divisions while maintaining unity within its forces. The Germans slightly spread their forces as they swept across France and then converged on Dunkirk, where Operation Dynamo occurred, yielding France to the Germans. The French were in violation of Armies Contending, chapter seven of The Art Of War, while the Germans were in accordance with it.
Nine Variations: Chapter eight of The Art Of War tells what to do and not do in different terrains, to choose your actions wisely, and how one of your own generals may be dangerous to you.[25]
When Guderian ignored Hitler’s halt order, he was not merely being defiant. The timing of Guderian’s disobedience allowed him to maintain the initiative and continue his drive through France.[26] When the British were preparing to withdraw, French Premier Paul Reynaud and Generalissimo Maxime Weygand were outraged and insisted that evacuations were unnecessary, which was false. The German Army was in accordance with Nine Variations, chapter eight of The Art Of War, while the French were in violation of it.
The Army on the Move: Chapter nine of The Art Of War, tells of how to do battle when moving through different terrains, how to detect what an enemy is doing or planning based on observations, and how to manage soldiers’ loyalty or lack thereof.[27]
On May 13, Rommel attacked across the Meuse river with his 7th Panzer Division. The French resistance was strong, however, Rommel’s infantry was able to take enough ground for his engineers to build bridges for the tanks to cross. By creating a large enough pocket on the opposite bank of the Meuse, Rommel was able to secure his advance.[28] By creating the pocket of infantry, Rommel was in accordance with The Army on the Move, chapter 9 of The Art Of War. The French defenders were partially in accordance with The Army on the Move by disrupting Rommel’s crossing before he had completed it. The French were overcome because they were in the midst of replacing the 1st Cavalry Division with the 18th Infantry Division, which arrived with no anti-tank guns or artillery support.[29]
Forms of Terrain: Chapter ten of The Art Of War defines and explains the different forms terrains can take, how to respond to them, and the six issues that cause defeat.[30]
When the 1st Panzer Division was crossing the Ardennes, two companies from the Belgian Chasseurs Ardennais stalled the 1st Panzer Division from 0745 hrs to 2015 hrs. While the defenders were spirited, they were few in number and were routed. The inadequate leadership of the Allied forces caused the defenses to fall into chaos, as is said would happen in that scenario in Forms of Terrain, chapter ten of The Art Of War. In Allied rear areas, the Luftwaffe caused confusion and damage, while also gaining air superiority over the French.[31] When Rommel and his 7th Panzer Division crossed the Meuse, Rommel crossed with the first battalion. He also led his infantrymen to repel the French armor using light machine guns, defending his pocket on the bank.[32] These are examples where the Germans were in accordance with Forms of Terrain.
Nine Terrains: Chapter eleven of The Art Of War defines the different types of terrain based upon your situation or possible courses of action, and what to do in those different terrains.[33]
According to Nine Terrains, France was heavy terrain, where the German drive pressed deep into France and put many towns and cities behind them. For the French, northern France was deadly terrain, where they would have to do battle quickly or be destroyed.[34] The Germans followed Nine Terrains and pressed on, while the French failed to engage the Germans with adequate resistance and the Germans broke through. The Germans seized the opportunity and once their advance was in motion, the French were unable to stop them. Dunkirk was encircled terrain, which led the British to follow the course of action prescribed in Nine Terrains, and begin planning their next move. The British followed Nine Terrains and took the narrow pass that was escape across the English Channel.[35] Germany and the BEF - albeit only after defeat was inevitable - were in accordance with Nine Terrains, while the French were not.
Attack With Fire: Chapter twelve of The Art Of War tells how to use fire to attack or assist your attack, what water can do for your attack, and how to keep a state intact and preserve its peace.
The German Army used flamethrowers in the invasion of France. Flamethrowers were useful in attacking fixed positions at a close range, and excelled at attacking fixed fortifications such as pillboxes. French leadership wished to stay and fight while the British were planning and executing Operation Dynamo. With this stubborn resentment towards yielding, Weygand would have caused the BEF to be destroyed if it were not for Operation Dynamo. The British evacuation allowed them to survive and continue the fight. The British were in accordance with Attack With Fire, chapter 12 of The Art Of War.
Using Spies: Chapter thirteen of The Art Of War stresses the importance of having knowledge about the enemy and their plans when you are planning and preparing for conflict, and the need for different types of spies to collect the necessary information.[36]
On January 10, 1940, the Belgians captured the German invasion plans after the plane carrying the plans crashed near Mechelen, Belgium. The Belgians informed the French and British of what was detailed in the plan, which was that the German offensive would focus on north-east Belgium. The French, who were at the time responsible for Allied strategy, failed to utilize this information in their defenses against the German invasion.[37] The French conduct is in alignment with what a bad general does as detailed in Using Spies, chapter thirteen of The Art Of War. Consequently, the French played into the German plan and were unable to stop the Fall of France.
Analysis of The Battle of France Using The Nine Principles of War
Mass: The principle of concentrating your strength at the right time and place to gain the advantage or achieve victory. An army can be large but lacking in mass, as their strength may not be focused.[38]
In the German invasion of France in 1940, the German Army gathered its strength on the Belgian border and attacked straight through Belgium, pinning half a million Allied troops against the Channel coast at Dunkirk. By avoiding the Maginot Line and attacking through the Ardennes, Germany focused its strength where it would be most effective, and continued to do so until it pressed the Allies against the coast.[39] The French lacked mass by failing to focus their strength and blunt the German drive. French armor was scattered, which placed it at a disadvantage against the German panzer divisions.
Objective: The principle of having a clear and well-defined goal, or recursively objective, that is attainable and strategically meaningful.[40]
Germany’s objective was to defeat the French and remove the British from Continental Europe, which was accomplished by defeating the Allied forces, not by capturing Paris. Germany had a clear and strong objective that was attainable.[41]
Offensive: Offensive allows forces to seize and maintain the initiative, and allows them to reach their objectives.[42]
The French plan was to counter a German invasion, not to attack Germany. Germany seized the initiative when it invaded France, and maintained its offensive in order to similarly maintain the initiative. Germany’s unyielding offensive allowed it to crush the French defenses, and press the Allied forces to the English Channel.[43]
Security: Security is disallowing the enemy knowledge of your plans, while also using knowledge of enemy plans to aid in protecting your strategy and operations. Simply, security is utilizing intelligence and counter-intelligence.[44]
When the “Mechelen Incident” occurred, the German plan was revealed to Allied forces. The French failed to use this information to improve their defense, leading to the Fall of France. Both Germany and France were lacking in security, however, the failure of French security mitigated the effects of German security being breached at Mechelen.[45]
Economy of Force: Economy of force is efficiently deploying your forces, so that you allocate minimal strength to secondary objectives, allowing the force dedicated to your primary objective to have mass. Mass and economy of force are closely related, with economy of force being almost a “double negative” version of mass.[46]
France failed in using economy of force by providing inadequate defenses at the Ardennes and the Meuse. The Germans exercised economy of force by not capturing Paris until after Allied forces had been removed from France, which allowed the Germans to maintain the initiative and avoid slowing the offensive.
Maneuver: Maneuver is positioning and moving one’s forces to gain an advantage over the enemy. Maneuver also allows you to effectively defend yourself and maintain momentum in combat.[47]
Bewegungskrieg is a traditional German method of waging war using maneuver. By successfully applying maneuver to tanks and aircraft, Germany was able to induce panic by their drive through France and attacks against French rear areas using aircraft. The French failed to position enough defenders near the Ardennes and the Meuse, which allowed the Germans to exploit these weaknesses and press Allied forces to the Channel coast.[48]
Unity of Command: Unity of command is having a sound command structure at all levels of warfare, where forces are united under one commander, with the authority over the entire army to direct it towards a common objective.[49]
Germany’s three army groups each had their own commander and chain of command, however they were united under Hitler. Issues stemmed from when the German High Command of the Army, Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH), clashed with Hitler and the Wehrmacht High Command, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). This divide at the strategic and grand strategic levels caused disagreements, where German leaders would simply agree to disagree. During the planning of the German attack on Western Europe, which was known as Fall Gelb (Case Yellow), Guderian argued that XIX Panzer Corps could cross the Meuse on the fifth day of the invasion, while OKH commander Franz Halder argued that it would be impossible to cross the Meuse before the ninth or tenth day of the invasion. The verdict was for Guderian to attempt to cross and if he was unable to do so then Halder’s proposal would take effect. Fall Gelb allowed for the commanders on the scene to have control over their own decision making. This increased unity of command at the lower levels, although at the strategic level conflict between Hitler, the OKW, and the OKH created a lack of unity of command for Germany.[50]
Surprise: Surprise is to attack the enemy in at an unexpected time or in an unexpected manner, gaining you the advantage. Surprise is the reciprocal of security, which is to defend against surprise.[51]
Germany surprised France by attacking directly through Belgium, including the Ardennes, and quickly pressing the Allied forces to the Channel coast at Dunkirk, instead of using a sweeping attack towards Paris. The French were anticipating a sweeping attack similar to the Schlieffen Plan with foolish confidence, and consequently rushed their troops into Belgium. By taking the French commanders by surprise, the Germans were able to swiftly bring about the Fall of France.
Simplicity: Simplicity is when plans are made in a clear and uncomplicated manner, with concise orders further supporting clarity.[52]
When Germany invaded France, divisional and corps commanders were given freedom to choose different courses of action in order to better take advantage of opportunities than if they were micromanaged from a higher level. This delegation of tasks overcame the issues with unity of command, and allowed individual commanders to work towards a common objective in their own manner.[53]
Conclusion
If I were to teach the Battle of France, I would use Sun Tzu’s The Art Of War. The Art Of War is not a list of principles, it is more like an instruction manual or troubleshooting guide for waging war. The Art Of War tells you what to do if you want victory, and what will cause you to lose. While the nine principles of war give you nine concepts to emulate or strive for with your forces, The Art Of War provides you with simple instructions that tell you what is and isn’t prudent based upon the scenario. The nine principles of war give you metrics which you can then use to appraise your situation and later select your course of action. The Art Of War provides a tool to directly appraise your situation and direct your course of action, with less room for uncertainty relative to the nine principles of war. The Art Of War underlines the importance of time in waging war, how troops will tire and costs will mount as war drags on, which is not emphasized in the nine principles of war to the extent as in The Art Of War. By making the costs of a prolonged war clear, Sun Tzu brings logistics to attention in a way that the nine principles do not, providing a more comprehensive guide to waging war.
Sources
Footnotes
[1] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 47-49.
[2] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 52, 60.
[3] Ibid., 70-71.
[4] Ibid., 75-77.
[5] Ibid., 50-52.
[6] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 60.
[7] Ibid., 66.
[8] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 53-55.
[9] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 52, 60, 72.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid., 47, 70-72.
[12] Ibid., 61-62.
[13] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 59-61.
[14] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 60.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 59-61.
[17] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 75.
[18] Ibid.,, 60, 68.
[19] Ibid., 61-62.
[20] Ibid., 63.
[21] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 62-65.
[22] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 61.
[23] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 66-69.
[24] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 59.
[25] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 70-72.
[26] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 74-75.
[27] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 73-77.
[28] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 70-72.
[29] Ibid., 71.
[30] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 78-81.
[31] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 69-70.
[32] Ibid., 71.
[33] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 82-89.
[34] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 75.
[35] Ibid., 79-81.
[36] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 93-95.
[37] Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man, (London: Penguin Books, 2007), xlii.
[38] “Appendix D: Principles of War,” United States Air Force, accessed February 24, 2019, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pub1/appendix_d.pdf.
[39] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 80.
[40] “Appendix D: Principles of War,” United States Air Force, accessed February 24, 2019, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pub1/appendix_d.pdf.
[41] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 54.
[42] “Appendix D: Principles of War,” United States Air Force, accessed February 24, 2019, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pub1/appendix_d.pdf.
[43] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 54.
[44] “Appendix D: Principles of War,” United States Air Force, accessed February 24, 2019, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pub1/appendix_d.pdf.
[45] Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man, (London: Penguin Books, 2007), xlii.
[46] “Appendix D: Principles of War,” United States Air Force, accessed February 24, 2019, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pub1/appendix_d.pdf.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 58-83.
[49] “Appendix D: Principles of War,” United States Air Force, accessed February 24, 2019, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pub1/appendix_d.pdf.
[50] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 58-83.
[51] “Appendix D: Principles of War,” United States Air Force, accessed February 24, 2019, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pub1/appendix_d.pdf.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 58-83.
Calculations: Chapter one of Sun Tzu’s The Art Of War sets the scene for the rest of the book, introducing the concepts of the Way, the sky, the earth, command, and method, and how to use what they entail to compare opposing forces.[1]
The German invasion of France in May of 1940 demonstrated many of the traits specified in the first chapter of Sun Tzu’s The Art Of War. Maurice Gamelin, commander in chief of the French Army during the opening phases of the Battle of France, had no desire to attack the Germans, and the French tactical and operational concepts were outdated.[2] The German commanders, in contrast, particularly Heinz Guderian, Erwin Rommel, Fedor von Bock, Erich von Manstein, and Gerd von Rundstedt, were effective and skilled commanders. Guderian with XIX Panzer Corps and Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division crossed the Meuse River and the Ardennes woods and launched a powerful drive across France.[3] Hitler was afraid of the advance being broken due to its rapid pace and issued a halt order, which infuriated Guderian. Guderian took initiative and continued his advance westward.[4]
The Wehrmacht was equipped with contemporary weaponry and utilized modern doctrine, for example placing its tanks into panzer corps. The French contrasted this with outdated tactics and, for example by dispersing their tanks in small numbers and treating the Ardennes as an impasse to the German advance, which it was not. While soldiers on both sides fought hard, the French operational structure was inferior to that of the Germans. Germany was in accordance with Calculations, chapter one of The Art Of War.
Starting a Battle: Chapter two of The Art Of War discusses the costs of a campaign, and to minimize them by achieving a “speedy victory” while also using captured resources to supply a conquering army.[5]
The German Army’s rapid advance overran the French, avoided the Stellungskrieg (positional warfare) of World War One, and instead engaged in a version of Bewegungskrieg (maneuver warfare) augmented by modern technology, where armor and aircraft create a gap in the enemy lines, which is then widened using mechanized and motorized units.[6] By keeping the invasion swift and dedicated, the German commanders kept down the costs of the campaign by avoiding Stellungskrieg. The Wehrmacht also used the resources captured in France, such as iron ore, to fuel the war effort.[7] The German invasion of France was in accordance with Starting a Battle, chapter two of The Art Of War.
Planning an Attack: Chapter three of The Art Of War says that ideally the enemy is defeated without fighting, how to divide forces based on their size, how a ruler can endanger his army, and what is entailed in knowing how to win.[8]
In terms of divisions, the German and French armies were approximately equal. However, the French forces were poorly deployed and using outdated tactical and operational concepts.[9] The Ardennes woods were almost entirely unguarded, and the French possessed no reserves to counterattack with.[10] The German generals were capable and effective in leading their men.[11] The French doctrine lacked flexibility and the ability to respond quickly to the enemy, limiting its versatility.[12] The French did not know themselves or their enemy, the Wehrmacht, which led to the Fall of France. The French defenders were in violation of Planning an Attack, chapter three of The Art Of War.
Form: Chapter four of The Art Of War explains that one must first build a unbreakable defense, and then wait for the enemy to expose a vulnerability before striking, and to have victory assured before doing battle.[13]
Following the winter of 1939-40, France had significant vulnerabilities in its defense, which Germany exploited during the Battle of France.[14] The Germans attacked through the lightly defended Ardennes. The German invasion plan made the assumptions that the French would not defend the Ardennes, would weakly defend the Meuse, would move their forces into Belgium, and have no reserves to counter the German breakthrough.[15] Luckily for Germany, France played into these assumptions and was in violation of Form, chapter four of The Art Of War. Germany was not perfectly aligned with Form, however, the French failed at taking advantage of the German gamble, negating the weaknesses in the German plan.
Circumstance: Chapter five of The Art Of War explains that warfare can only be regular or irregular. By having a strong force of circumstance and by exhibiting brief restraint, one can use the endless variations of regular and irregular warfare to achieve victory.[16]
Germany had a strong force of circumstance, they had to maintain their momentum and overrun the Allies without giving them the time to respond.[17] Germany utilized efficient variations of regular warfare, combined with their new methods of warfare, such as the glider assault on the Belgian fortress of Eben Emael or the use of panzer divisions to penetrate and break-up enemy lines and then exploit the opportunities created.[18] The French forces were disadvantaged by their doctrine, which lacked flexibility and was consequently slow to adapt to changing conditions.[19] The Allied reluctance to attack meant that they would not have the same drive as the German forces when they met in battle, which would end with the catastrophic Fall of France.[20] France was in violation of Circumstance, chapter five of The Art Of War, while Germany was in accordance with it.
The Empty And The Solid: Chapter six of The Art Of War tells of how to create a position of dominance over the enemy no matter their number by utilizing terrain and becoming unpredictable, and the advantages of having a concentrated force.[21]
Germany used concentrated panzer corps in the 1940 invasion of France, while the French Army dispersed its tanks throughout its ranks. This allowed the German offensive to tear through the French defenses, which were rushed and unprepared for the German invasion. The French decided to move their central reserve away from the Ardennes and instead positioned it to link with Holland, leaving the Ardennes open.[22] Germany caught the French by surprise, and the French forces were beaten back to the Channel. The German offensive was solid, while the French defense was empty, as in The Empty And The Solid, chapter six of The Art Of War.
Armies Contending: Chapter seven of The Art Of War discusses the difficulties of competing armies, the penalties of overextending your forces to contend for an advantage, and how to contend for an advantage deceptively.[23]
Germany was prepared to launch an invasion in 1940, and when they did the French were scrambling to try to defend. The Germans took advantage of the French disarray and crushed their forces with a powerful drive towards the English Channel.[24] Germany secured the advantage using an aggressive drive with its panzer divisions while maintaining unity within its forces. The Germans slightly spread their forces as they swept across France and then converged on Dunkirk, where Operation Dynamo occurred, yielding France to the Germans. The French were in violation of Armies Contending, chapter seven of The Art Of War, while the Germans were in accordance with it.
Nine Variations: Chapter eight of The Art Of War tells what to do and not do in different terrains, to choose your actions wisely, and how one of your own generals may be dangerous to you.[25]
When Guderian ignored Hitler’s halt order, he was not merely being defiant. The timing of Guderian’s disobedience allowed him to maintain the initiative and continue his drive through France.[26] When the British were preparing to withdraw, French Premier Paul Reynaud and Generalissimo Maxime Weygand were outraged and insisted that evacuations were unnecessary, which was false. The German Army was in accordance with Nine Variations, chapter eight of The Art Of War, while the French were in violation of it.
The Army on the Move: Chapter nine of The Art Of War, tells of how to do battle when moving through different terrains, how to detect what an enemy is doing or planning based on observations, and how to manage soldiers’ loyalty or lack thereof.[27]
On May 13, Rommel attacked across the Meuse river with his 7th Panzer Division. The French resistance was strong, however, Rommel’s infantry was able to take enough ground for his engineers to build bridges for the tanks to cross. By creating a large enough pocket on the opposite bank of the Meuse, Rommel was able to secure his advance.[28] By creating the pocket of infantry, Rommel was in accordance with The Army on the Move, chapter 9 of The Art Of War. The French defenders were partially in accordance with The Army on the Move by disrupting Rommel’s crossing before he had completed it. The French were overcome because they were in the midst of replacing the 1st Cavalry Division with the 18th Infantry Division, which arrived with no anti-tank guns or artillery support.[29]
Forms of Terrain: Chapter ten of The Art Of War defines and explains the different forms terrains can take, how to respond to them, and the six issues that cause defeat.[30]
When the 1st Panzer Division was crossing the Ardennes, two companies from the Belgian Chasseurs Ardennais stalled the 1st Panzer Division from 0745 hrs to 2015 hrs. While the defenders were spirited, they were few in number and were routed. The inadequate leadership of the Allied forces caused the defenses to fall into chaos, as is said would happen in that scenario in Forms of Terrain, chapter ten of The Art Of War. In Allied rear areas, the Luftwaffe caused confusion and damage, while also gaining air superiority over the French.[31] When Rommel and his 7th Panzer Division crossed the Meuse, Rommel crossed with the first battalion. He also led his infantrymen to repel the French armor using light machine guns, defending his pocket on the bank.[32] These are examples where the Germans were in accordance with Forms of Terrain.
Nine Terrains: Chapter eleven of The Art Of War defines the different types of terrain based upon your situation or possible courses of action, and what to do in those different terrains.[33]
According to Nine Terrains, France was heavy terrain, where the German drive pressed deep into France and put many towns and cities behind them. For the French, northern France was deadly terrain, where they would have to do battle quickly or be destroyed.[34] The Germans followed Nine Terrains and pressed on, while the French failed to engage the Germans with adequate resistance and the Germans broke through. The Germans seized the opportunity and once their advance was in motion, the French were unable to stop them. Dunkirk was encircled terrain, which led the British to follow the course of action prescribed in Nine Terrains, and begin planning their next move. The British followed Nine Terrains and took the narrow pass that was escape across the English Channel.[35] Germany and the BEF - albeit only after defeat was inevitable - were in accordance with Nine Terrains, while the French were not.
Attack With Fire: Chapter twelve of The Art Of War tells how to use fire to attack or assist your attack, what water can do for your attack, and how to keep a state intact and preserve its peace.
The German Army used flamethrowers in the invasion of France. Flamethrowers were useful in attacking fixed positions at a close range, and excelled at attacking fixed fortifications such as pillboxes. French leadership wished to stay and fight while the British were planning and executing Operation Dynamo. With this stubborn resentment towards yielding, Weygand would have caused the BEF to be destroyed if it were not for Operation Dynamo. The British evacuation allowed them to survive and continue the fight. The British were in accordance with Attack With Fire, chapter 12 of The Art Of War.
Using Spies: Chapter thirteen of The Art Of War stresses the importance of having knowledge about the enemy and their plans when you are planning and preparing for conflict, and the need for different types of spies to collect the necessary information.[36]
On January 10, 1940, the Belgians captured the German invasion plans after the plane carrying the plans crashed near Mechelen, Belgium. The Belgians informed the French and British of what was detailed in the plan, which was that the German offensive would focus on north-east Belgium. The French, who were at the time responsible for Allied strategy, failed to utilize this information in their defenses against the German invasion.[37] The French conduct is in alignment with what a bad general does as detailed in Using Spies, chapter thirteen of The Art Of War. Consequently, the French played into the German plan and were unable to stop the Fall of France.
Analysis of The Battle of France Using The Nine Principles of War
Mass: The principle of concentrating your strength at the right time and place to gain the advantage or achieve victory. An army can be large but lacking in mass, as their strength may not be focused.[38]
In the German invasion of France in 1940, the German Army gathered its strength on the Belgian border and attacked straight through Belgium, pinning half a million Allied troops against the Channel coast at Dunkirk. By avoiding the Maginot Line and attacking through the Ardennes, Germany focused its strength where it would be most effective, and continued to do so until it pressed the Allies against the coast.[39] The French lacked mass by failing to focus their strength and blunt the German drive. French armor was scattered, which placed it at a disadvantage against the German panzer divisions.
Objective: The principle of having a clear and well-defined goal, or recursively objective, that is attainable and strategically meaningful.[40]
Germany’s objective was to defeat the French and remove the British from Continental Europe, which was accomplished by defeating the Allied forces, not by capturing Paris. Germany had a clear and strong objective that was attainable.[41]
Offensive: Offensive allows forces to seize and maintain the initiative, and allows them to reach their objectives.[42]
The French plan was to counter a German invasion, not to attack Germany. Germany seized the initiative when it invaded France, and maintained its offensive in order to similarly maintain the initiative. Germany’s unyielding offensive allowed it to crush the French defenses, and press the Allied forces to the English Channel.[43]
Security: Security is disallowing the enemy knowledge of your plans, while also using knowledge of enemy plans to aid in protecting your strategy and operations. Simply, security is utilizing intelligence and counter-intelligence.[44]
When the “Mechelen Incident” occurred, the German plan was revealed to Allied forces. The French failed to use this information to improve their defense, leading to the Fall of France. Both Germany and France were lacking in security, however, the failure of French security mitigated the effects of German security being breached at Mechelen.[45]
Economy of Force: Economy of force is efficiently deploying your forces, so that you allocate minimal strength to secondary objectives, allowing the force dedicated to your primary objective to have mass. Mass and economy of force are closely related, with economy of force being almost a “double negative” version of mass.[46]
France failed in using economy of force by providing inadequate defenses at the Ardennes and the Meuse. The Germans exercised economy of force by not capturing Paris until after Allied forces had been removed from France, which allowed the Germans to maintain the initiative and avoid slowing the offensive.
Maneuver: Maneuver is positioning and moving one’s forces to gain an advantage over the enemy. Maneuver also allows you to effectively defend yourself and maintain momentum in combat.[47]
Bewegungskrieg is a traditional German method of waging war using maneuver. By successfully applying maneuver to tanks and aircraft, Germany was able to induce panic by their drive through France and attacks against French rear areas using aircraft. The French failed to position enough defenders near the Ardennes and the Meuse, which allowed the Germans to exploit these weaknesses and press Allied forces to the Channel coast.[48]
Unity of Command: Unity of command is having a sound command structure at all levels of warfare, where forces are united under one commander, with the authority over the entire army to direct it towards a common objective.[49]
Germany’s three army groups each had their own commander and chain of command, however they were united under Hitler. Issues stemmed from when the German High Command of the Army, Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH), clashed with Hitler and the Wehrmacht High Command, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). This divide at the strategic and grand strategic levels caused disagreements, where German leaders would simply agree to disagree. During the planning of the German attack on Western Europe, which was known as Fall Gelb (Case Yellow), Guderian argued that XIX Panzer Corps could cross the Meuse on the fifth day of the invasion, while OKH commander Franz Halder argued that it would be impossible to cross the Meuse before the ninth or tenth day of the invasion. The verdict was for Guderian to attempt to cross and if he was unable to do so then Halder’s proposal would take effect. Fall Gelb allowed for the commanders on the scene to have control over their own decision making. This increased unity of command at the lower levels, although at the strategic level conflict between Hitler, the OKW, and the OKH created a lack of unity of command for Germany.[50]
Surprise: Surprise is to attack the enemy in at an unexpected time or in an unexpected manner, gaining you the advantage. Surprise is the reciprocal of security, which is to defend against surprise.[51]
Germany surprised France by attacking directly through Belgium, including the Ardennes, and quickly pressing the Allied forces to the Channel coast at Dunkirk, instead of using a sweeping attack towards Paris. The French were anticipating a sweeping attack similar to the Schlieffen Plan with foolish confidence, and consequently rushed their troops into Belgium. By taking the French commanders by surprise, the Germans were able to swiftly bring about the Fall of France.
Simplicity: Simplicity is when plans are made in a clear and uncomplicated manner, with concise orders further supporting clarity.[52]
When Germany invaded France, divisional and corps commanders were given freedom to choose different courses of action in order to better take advantage of opportunities than if they were micromanaged from a higher level. This delegation of tasks overcame the issues with unity of command, and allowed individual commanders to work towards a common objective in their own manner.[53]
Conclusion
If I were to teach the Battle of France, I would use Sun Tzu’s The Art Of War. The Art Of War is not a list of principles, it is more like an instruction manual or troubleshooting guide for waging war. The Art Of War tells you what to do if you want victory, and what will cause you to lose. While the nine principles of war give you nine concepts to emulate or strive for with your forces, The Art Of War provides you with simple instructions that tell you what is and isn’t prudent based upon the scenario. The nine principles of war give you metrics which you can then use to appraise your situation and later select your course of action. The Art Of War provides a tool to directly appraise your situation and direct your course of action, with less room for uncertainty relative to the nine principles of war. The Art Of War underlines the importance of time in waging war, how troops will tire and costs will mount as war drags on, which is not emphasized in the nine principles of war to the extent as in The Art Of War. By making the costs of a prolonged war clear, Sun Tzu brings logistics to attention in a way that the nine principles do not, providing a more comprehensive guide to waging war.
Sources
- “Appendix D: Principles of War.” United States Air Force. Accessed February 24, 2019. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pub1/appendix_d.pdf.
- “Chapter XIV: The Flame Thrower in the Pacific: Guadalcanal to the Marshall Islands.” United States Army. Accessed February 25 2019. https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/chemsincmbt/ch14.htm.
- Murray, Williamson, and Allan R. Millet. A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000.
- Sebag-Montefiore, Hugh. Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man. London: Penguin Books, 2007.
- Sun Tzu, The Art Of War. Translated by Peter Harris. New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018.
Footnotes
[1] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 47-49.
[2] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 52, 60.
[3] Ibid., 70-71.
[4] Ibid., 75-77.
[5] Ibid., 50-52.
[6] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 60.
[7] Ibid., 66.
[8] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 53-55.
[9] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 52, 60, 72.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid., 47, 70-72.
[12] Ibid., 61-62.
[13] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 59-61.
[14] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 60.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 59-61.
[17] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 75.
[18] Ibid.,, 60, 68.
[19] Ibid., 61-62.
[20] Ibid., 63.
[21] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 62-65.
[22] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 61.
[23] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 66-69.
[24] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 59.
[25] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 70-72.
[26] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 74-75.
[27] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 73-77.
[28] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 70-72.
[29] Ibid., 71.
[30] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 78-81.
[31] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 69-70.
[32] Ibid., 71.
[33] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 82-89.
[34] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 75.
[35] Ibid., 79-81.
[36] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2018), 93-95.
[37] Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man, (London: Penguin Books, 2007), xlii.
[38] “Appendix D: Principles of War,” United States Air Force, accessed February 24, 2019, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pub1/appendix_d.pdf.
[39] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 80.
[40] “Appendix D: Principles of War,” United States Air Force, accessed February 24, 2019, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pub1/appendix_d.pdf.
[41] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 54.
[42] “Appendix D: Principles of War,” United States Air Force, accessed February 24, 2019, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pub1/appendix_d.pdf.
[43] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 54.
[44] “Appendix D: Principles of War,” United States Air Force, accessed February 24, 2019, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pub1/appendix_d.pdf.
[45] Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man, (London: Penguin Books, 2007), xlii.
[46] “Appendix D: Principles of War,” United States Air Force, accessed February 24, 2019, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pub1/appendix_d.pdf.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 58-83.
[49] “Appendix D: Principles of War,” United States Air Force, accessed February 24, 2019, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pub1/appendix_d.pdf.
[50] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 58-83.
[51] “Appendix D: Principles of War,” United States Air Force, accessed February 24, 2019, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pub1/appendix_d.pdf.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 58-83.