The Battle of Imphal: The Why and How
by
ANR
Imphal was the capital of the state of Manipur in India at the time of World War II, bordered by Burma. In the first half of 1942, the Japanese captured Burma, which was “rich in natural resources.”[1] The terrain of the Imphal Valley was ideal for crossing from Burma into India. The British in neighboring towns of Imphal were also ill-prepared for potential invasion. In the May of 1942, the Japanese bombed Imphal twice, but they did not muster land forces to cross the border from Burma into India. This was due to the Japanese’s lack of support and resources, and they had to hold the territory they captured in Burma.
In order to strengthen the Imphal region, the “Allies immediately began work on upgrading the region’s infrastructure.”[2] Roads, airfields, and railways were built and improved. The Allies also realized that Imphal could be used as a starting point for an offensive in central Burma, so supply depots and supply lines were also built.
In the January of 1944, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo allowed the capture of Imphal to happen. The logic for this was that in order to secure the Japanese position in Burma, the Japanese would lead the Allies into a pre-emptive strike that would occur in the Imphal valley and its surrounding areas. However, Lieutenant-General Mutaguchi had greater aspirations for this campaign. After the capture of Imphal, he would press on to the “town of Dimapur, a major supply base through which ran the railway of line to Ledo. This was the line the Americans were using to send supplies to the airfields farther north, from where they were being flown to China.”[3]
Mutaguchi initially planned for a quick operation to capture Imphal in the March of 1944. Before this operation, he planned to stage a diversionary attack in Arakan in order to distract the British from Imphal. This attack failed, and Mutaguchi decided to try to outsmart the British by having his 33rd Division to march towards Imphal from the south, “where the main routes to Tiddim and Tamu in Burma lay.”[4] Then, while the British were trying to stop the 33rd Division, the 15th Division was sent to approach Imphal from the north, where the defenses were poor.
Slims plans to defend Imphal were the exact opposite of the Japanese. “He fully expected Fourteenth Army’s men to stand their ground and fight the Japanese onslaught, before beating it back.”[5] The Fourteenth Armys IV Corps plan was to fight the Japanese in a tight circle in the Imphal Valley. “Two of its divisions were already deployed beyond the India-Burma frontier in the south towards the ends of roads emanating from Imphal: the 20th Indian Division around Tamu on the Tamu-Palel Road and the 17th Indian Light Division (it had only two brigade groups) around Tiddim on the Tiddim Road.”[6] The 23rd Division, meanwhile was a reserve in Imphal, and a brigade was also placed in the area of Ukhrul, situated in the northeast.
When the Japanese offensive began, the southern divisions were to go on the defensive around Imphal Valley. This enabled them to have communication lines and supplies behind them, while the Japanese would have to work hard to get over the mountains. “The Japanese attack would first be withstood, then broken up, before Fourteenth Army would go on the offensive.”[7]
The Japanese Fifteenth Army at Imphal was commanded by Lieutenant-General Mutaguchi Renya. “Mutaguchi was a division commander during the Japanese defeat of the British in Malaya and Singapore in 1942. The experience had given him a poor view of the latter’s military capabilities, an opinion he maintained right through to 1944.”[8] Mutaguchi was a stubborn man and argued with his officers during the Imphal campaign, resulting in officers being replaced.[9] The lieutenant-general of the Japanese 33rd division, Yanagida, was fired during the battle due to his poor relationship with Mutaguchi, and was replaced with Major-General Tanaka. Major-General Yamoto led the infantry of the 33rd Division. Lieutenant-General Yamauchi commanded the 15th Division, but was also fired and replaced with Lieutenant-General Shibata. The Japanese Force consisted of “around 70,000 men, including two Divisions – the 15th and the 33rd – of its 15th Army.”[10]
On the British side, there “were more than 120,000 men of the British 14th Army, including a mix of Gurkhas, Indians and the British.”[11] Lieutenant-General William Slim was in charge of the Fourteenth Army. He was an officer who cared about his men, which led them to place their trust in him. He took command of the Fourteenth Army in the October of 1943. In 1942, he was sent to command the Burma Corps during their retreat from Burma. This gave him experience in fighting the Japanese, and “set about ensuring that the mistakes the British had committed were not repeated in a future fight with the Japanese.”[12]
Lieutenant-General Geoffrey Scoones was the leader of the 4th Corps at Imphal. “Scoones had recently served as Director of Military Operations at General Headquarters in Delhi, and was considered a thinking and analytical officer.”[13]
Major-General Douglas Gracey commanded the 20th Indian Division, which he had raised in 1942 in order to fight the Japanese. Major-General Cowan was the commander of the 17th Indian Division. “This division had fought against the Japanese 33rd Division during the withdrawal from Burma and lost many men in the Sittang Bridge disaster in February 1942.”[14] After the Sittang Bridge disaster, Cowan took care to make sure his men were prepared to fight the Japanese. Major-General Ouvry Roberts commanded the 23rd Indian Division, and Major-General Harold Briggs led the 5th Indian Division, which was made of two brigades that were flown in for the purpose of reinforcement.
The INA (Indian National Army), did not have much of a presence at Imphal compared to the British and the Japanese. Subhash Chandra Bose was the commander of the INA, and it was due to him that the INA was even at Imphal. Bose “had once been the president of the Indian National Congress, the main political party in the country at the time and at the forefront of the struggle for Indian independence.”[15] Bose was on the run from the British, and had the INA join the Japanese in a bid to free India from the British.
The Fifteenth Army was the Japanese force at Imphal. This army had a strength of 84,000 men. Two of its infantry divisions were at Imphal, the 15th Division (15,000 men) and the 33rd Division (18,000 men). The 31st division (15,000 men) advanced towards Kohima in the north. “The remaining 36,000 men were army troops, while another 4,000-odd soldiers arrived as reinforcements as the Imphal battle wore on.”[16]
The 15th Division was one of the two divisions that were ordered to capture Imphal, but it was “under-strength and under-gunned when it began its advance.”[17] It was delayed while advancing towards the India-Burma frontier, and at one point it had to build a road from northern Thailand to Burma. Some units went east in order to carry out the second Chindit mission (code name: Operation Thursday). After these reductions, the Fifteenth consisted of six infantry battalions instead of nine. As the battle wore on, a battalion of the 15th was deployed to support the 33rd. “It could muster only 18 guns and its infantry companies were under-manned, with a strength of around 100 men each.”[18] The Fifteenth Army also had the support of the 5th Air Division of the Japanese Army Air Force, which by the time the Imphal offensive started, consisted of 131 aircraft, with 81 being fighters.
The Fourteenth Army had its IV Corps at Imphal, which was made of the 17th Indian Division, the 20th Indian Division, and the 23rd Indian Division. Later, in March 1944, the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade would arrive. “As the battle unfolded, reinforcements were flown in from the Arakan (where the army’s XV Corps was deployed) in the form of two brigades of the 5th Indian Division and one brigade from the 7th Indian Division.”[19] The Royal Air Force Group 221, along with the squadrons of Troop Carrier Command, provided aerial support. The Allies had complete air superiority at Imphal and in the frontier when the Japanese launched their Imphal offensive. At any point of the offensive, the Allies had at least three times the amount of aircraft than the Japanese 5th Air Division. The number of planes that the Allies had only increased as time went on. The total strength of the Fourteenth Army, excluding non-combatants, was about 120,000 men.
As previously stated, the INA was the smallest fighting force at Imphal. “The INA was militarily engaged at Imphal in two ways. The first was through its irregular groups (or units) - a few hundred men attached to each of the Japanese Divisions.”[20] The irregular groups were tasked with gathering intelligence while acting as propagandists. They would attempt to persuade their fellow Indians in the Fourteenth Army to desert and join the INA. They would also take in any Fourteenth Army Indians that surrendered. Others were charged with the tasks of sabotage and guerilla operations.
“The main INA presence was through the 1st Division and its three brigades. But at around 6,000 men, it had far fewer troops than equivalent Japanese or British formations.”[21] The INA also had a large number of civilian recruits that joined when Subhash Chandra Bose took over. The INA may have done more harm than good to the Japanese, since they were poorly equipped, armed, and trained for the terrain, as well as dependent on the Japanese for supplies and logistical assistance.
The Battle of Imphal can be described as a “hub-and-spoke”. The actual town of Imphal was the hub, while the routes leading to Imphal were the spokes of a sort of wheel.[22] The Southwest Theater of Imphal was in Tiddim, where a 164 mile road stretched from the Chin Hills of Burma to Imphal. Most of this road was mountainous, but as the road got closer to the Imphal Valley, the terrain became flat and abundant with paddy fields.
Major-General Cowan was the commander of the 17th Indian Division in the southwest, which had been deployed in that area in the year of 1943. “It had since established itself in the area: building defences, carrying out vigorous patrols and engaging in skirmishes with the Japanese.”[23] In March 1944, it became clear that the Japanese were going to invade India on the 15th. The plan called for the 17th Division to head up the Tiddim road in the north in order to be at the edge of the Imphal Valley.
“Yanagida’s division advanced in four columns. The left column, composed mostly of the 215th Regiment commanded by Colonel Sasahara, was supported by a battalion of mountain artillery and a detachment of engineers.”[24] The 215th crossed the hills in the south of Tiddim before heading north. It headed towards Milestones 109 and 110, because a supply depot lay in between them. Even though there were reports of the Japanese being sighted moving west of the Tiddim road, Scoones did not order Cowan to withdraw. Only after the Japanese were directly behind the 17th Indian Division did Scoones order the withdrawal.
This order led to the movement from Tiddim on March 14. “The 63rd Indian Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Burton, was at the front, while the 48th Indian Brigade, under the command of Brigadier Cameron, made up the rear.”[25] But, the Japanese had split the Tiddim Road in half, meaning that the 17th Indian Division would have to fight to reach Imphal. “To help Cowan, Scoones rushed to the Tiddim Road first one brigade - the 37th Indian Brigade - and then a second - the 49th Indian Brigade (from the Ukhrul Area) - from the 23rd
Indian Division.”[26] By March 15, the 37th Indian Brigade met the Japanese at around Milestone 100. The 37th Brigade was now fighting southwards on the Tiddim Road and the 17th Indian Division was fighting northwards.
The Japanese 214th Regiment around Tonzang and on the Tuitum Saddle that lay against the road was the first obstacle that the 17th had to get across. “On 16 March, ‘Hurribombers’ (Hawker Hurricane fighter-bombers) were called in to bomb and strafe the Tuitum Saddle. Heavy artillery bombardments came next, followed by an infantry attack. The Japanese position, exposed and devoid of overhead cover, was battered, and secured later that day.”[27] This meant that the 17th Division could cross the Manipur River, allowing them to leave behind a rearguard. This rearguard was assaulted constantly by the 214th Regiment.
“Farther north, the division had already bumped up against the next obstacle: the supply depot between Milestones 109 and 110. A battalion of the 215th Regiment had captured the depot on 18 March after only minor resistance. Some 2,700 administrative and support troops manning the depot had been evacuated just before the Japanese closed in.”[28] The 48th Indian Brigade was charged with the task of driving the Japanese out of the depot and the road. It send the Gurkha battalions: the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles and the 1/7th Gurkha Rifles. On March 23, the 2/5th Royal Gurkhas, well supported by guns and mortars, marched in with Tommy and Bren guns. This attack led to the capture of the ridge, and the Japanese withdrew.
The depot was could not be truly secured until after two positions overlooking the road were captured. The 1/7th Gurkhas led this attack, repeatedly attacking the Japanese bunkers, which were defended fiercely. However, on March 26th the Japanese retreated. “The entire depot area around Milestone 109 was secured. Whatever supplies that could be recovered and transported back to Imphal were now taken, while as many as possible that could be of potential value to the Japanese were destroyed.”[29] On that same day, the rearguard withdrew from the depot and blew up the Manipur Bridge.
In order to get to Imphal from the southeast, people had to take the Tamu-Palel Road. It was an all-weather road between India and Burma in 1944. “Tamu in the Kabaw Valley was the last village on the road on the Burma side of the border. Moreh was the first village on the Indian side; from here the road climbed sharply up the mountain range that ran along the frontier, to Tengnoupal village.”[30]
“The Yamamoto Force had set off northwards up the Kabaw Valley for Tamu at the same time as the other columns of the 33rd Division. Major-General Yamamoto commanded an infantry group formed around the 213th Regiment (less one battalion). Two more infantry battalions from the 15th Division were to join him. Importantly, he had in support the 14th Tank Regiment and most of a heavy field artillery regiment. Of the three Japanese forces advancing on Imphal, his had the most firepower and would be backed by the most direct route to the Chindwin River.”[31]
On March 26, a unit of Tamamoto Force capture Nippon Hill, but it was unable to advance any further. The 80th Indian Brigade was sent to deal with this, and before advancing, they heavily shelled Nippon Hill. Eventually, they captured the hill. This seems to be a pattern when dealing with Japanese defenses. Shelling and bombing were to happen first, and then an advance. But, the Japanese had “dug an extensive, deep network of underground tunnels and holes within their positions.”[32] These tunnels and holes “allowed them to withstand bombardments, while the small openings allowed for a sustained fire to be kept up on anyone who approached.”[33]
The Battles of Imphal and Kohima were the biggest defeats of the Japanese Army. “Although numbers vary, it is estimated that some 30,000 Japanese soldiers died and 23,000 were injured in this clash between their Fifteenth Army and the British Fourteenth Army.”[34]
Sources
Footnotes
[1] Hemant Singh Katoch, Imphal 1944: The Japanese invasion of India, (New York, Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2018), 4.
[2] Ibid., 5
[3] Ibid., 21
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., 22
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid., 21
[9] “Battles of Imphal and Kohima”, National Army Museum, https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/battle-imphal.
[10] “The warring sides”, Battle of Imphal Tours, https://www.battleofimphal.com/the-battle/the-warring-sides.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Katoch, Imphal, 12.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid., 13.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid., 14.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid., 15.
[20] Ibid., 17.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid., 23.
[23] Ibid., 25.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid., 26
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid., 27.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid., 30.
[31] Ibid., 31.
[32] Ibid., 32.
[33] Ibid., 35.
[34] Ibid., 88
In order to strengthen the Imphal region, the “Allies immediately began work on upgrading the region’s infrastructure.”[2] Roads, airfields, and railways were built and improved. The Allies also realized that Imphal could be used as a starting point for an offensive in central Burma, so supply depots and supply lines were also built.
In the January of 1944, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo allowed the capture of Imphal to happen. The logic for this was that in order to secure the Japanese position in Burma, the Japanese would lead the Allies into a pre-emptive strike that would occur in the Imphal valley and its surrounding areas. However, Lieutenant-General Mutaguchi had greater aspirations for this campaign. After the capture of Imphal, he would press on to the “town of Dimapur, a major supply base through which ran the railway of line to Ledo. This was the line the Americans were using to send supplies to the airfields farther north, from where they were being flown to China.”[3]
Mutaguchi initially planned for a quick operation to capture Imphal in the March of 1944. Before this operation, he planned to stage a diversionary attack in Arakan in order to distract the British from Imphal. This attack failed, and Mutaguchi decided to try to outsmart the British by having his 33rd Division to march towards Imphal from the south, “where the main routes to Tiddim and Tamu in Burma lay.”[4] Then, while the British were trying to stop the 33rd Division, the 15th Division was sent to approach Imphal from the north, where the defenses were poor.
Slims plans to defend Imphal were the exact opposite of the Japanese. “He fully expected Fourteenth Army’s men to stand their ground and fight the Japanese onslaught, before beating it back.”[5] The Fourteenth Armys IV Corps plan was to fight the Japanese in a tight circle in the Imphal Valley. “Two of its divisions were already deployed beyond the India-Burma frontier in the south towards the ends of roads emanating from Imphal: the 20th Indian Division around Tamu on the Tamu-Palel Road and the 17th Indian Light Division (it had only two brigade groups) around Tiddim on the Tiddim Road.”[6] The 23rd Division, meanwhile was a reserve in Imphal, and a brigade was also placed in the area of Ukhrul, situated in the northeast.
When the Japanese offensive began, the southern divisions were to go on the defensive around Imphal Valley. This enabled them to have communication lines and supplies behind them, while the Japanese would have to work hard to get over the mountains. “The Japanese attack would first be withstood, then broken up, before Fourteenth Army would go on the offensive.”[7]
The Japanese Fifteenth Army at Imphal was commanded by Lieutenant-General Mutaguchi Renya. “Mutaguchi was a division commander during the Japanese defeat of the British in Malaya and Singapore in 1942. The experience had given him a poor view of the latter’s military capabilities, an opinion he maintained right through to 1944.”[8] Mutaguchi was a stubborn man and argued with his officers during the Imphal campaign, resulting in officers being replaced.[9] The lieutenant-general of the Japanese 33rd division, Yanagida, was fired during the battle due to his poor relationship with Mutaguchi, and was replaced with Major-General Tanaka. Major-General Yamoto led the infantry of the 33rd Division. Lieutenant-General Yamauchi commanded the 15th Division, but was also fired and replaced with Lieutenant-General Shibata. The Japanese Force consisted of “around 70,000 men, including two Divisions – the 15th and the 33rd – of its 15th Army.”[10]
On the British side, there “were more than 120,000 men of the British 14th Army, including a mix of Gurkhas, Indians and the British.”[11] Lieutenant-General William Slim was in charge of the Fourteenth Army. He was an officer who cared about his men, which led them to place their trust in him. He took command of the Fourteenth Army in the October of 1943. In 1942, he was sent to command the Burma Corps during their retreat from Burma. This gave him experience in fighting the Japanese, and “set about ensuring that the mistakes the British had committed were not repeated in a future fight with the Japanese.”[12]
Lieutenant-General Geoffrey Scoones was the leader of the 4th Corps at Imphal. “Scoones had recently served as Director of Military Operations at General Headquarters in Delhi, and was considered a thinking and analytical officer.”[13]
Major-General Douglas Gracey commanded the 20th Indian Division, which he had raised in 1942 in order to fight the Japanese. Major-General Cowan was the commander of the 17th Indian Division. “This division had fought against the Japanese 33rd Division during the withdrawal from Burma and lost many men in the Sittang Bridge disaster in February 1942.”[14] After the Sittang Bridge disaster, Cowan took care to make sure his men were prepared to fight the Japanese. Major-General Ouvry Roberts commanded the 23rd Indian Division, and Major-General Harold Briggs led the 5th Indian Division, which was made of two brigades that were flown in for the purpose of reinforcement.
The INA (Indian National Army), did not have much of a presence at Imphal compared to the British and the Japanese. Subhash Chandra Bose was the commander of the INA, and it was due to him that the INA was even at Imphal. Bose “had once been the president of the Indian National Congress, the main political party in the country at the time and at the forefront of the struggle for Indian independence.”[15] Bose was on the run from the British, and had the INA join the Japanese in a bid to free India from the British.
The Fifteenth Army was the Japanese force at Imphal. This army had a strength of 84,000 men. Two of its infantry divisions were at Imphal, the 15th Division (15,000 men) and the 33rd Division (18,000 men). The 31st division (15,000 men) advanced towards Kohima in the north. “The remaining 36,000 men were army troops, while another 4,000-odd soldiers arrived as reinforcements as the Imphal battle wore on.”[16]
The 15th Division was one of the two divisions that were ordered to capture Imphal, but it was “under-strength and under-gunned when it began its advance.”[17] It was delayed while advancing towards the India-Burma frontier, and at one point it had to build a road from northern Thailand to Burma. Some units went east in order to carry out the second Chindit mission (code name: Operation Thursday). After these reductions, the Fifteenth consisted of six infantry battalions instead of nine. As the battle wore on, a battalion of the 15th was deployed to support the 33rd. “It could muster only 18 guns and its infantry companies were under-manned, with a strength of around 100 men each.”[18] The Fifteenth Army also had the support of the 5th Air Division of the Japanese Army Air Force, which by the time the Imphal offensive started, consisted of 131 aircraft, with 81 being fighters.
The Fourteenth Army had its IV Corps at Imphal, which was made of the 17th Indian Division, the 20th Indian Division, and the 23rd Indian Division. Later, in March 1944, the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade would arrive. “As the battle unfolded, reinforcements were flown in from the Arakan (where the army’s XV Corps was deployed) in the form of two brigades of the 5th Indian Division and one brigade from the 7th Indian Division.”[19] The Royal Air Force Group 221, along with the squadrons of Troop Carrier Command, provided aerial support. The Allies had complete air superiority at Imphal and in the frontier when the Japanese launched their Imphal offensive. At any point of the offensive, the Allies had at least three times the amount of aircraft than the Japanese 5th Air Division. The number of planes that the Allies had only increased as time went on. The total strength of the Fourteenth Army, excluding non-combatants, was about 120,000 men.
As previously stated, the INA was the smallest fighting force at Imphal. “The INA was militarily engaged at Imphal in two ways. The first was through its irregular groups (or units) - a few hundred men attached to each of the Japanese Divisions.”[20] The irregular groups were tasked with gathering intelligence while acting as propagandists. They would attempt to persuade their fellow Indians in the Fourteenth Army to desert and join the INA. They would also take in any Fourteenth Army Indians that surrendered. Others were charged with the tasks of sabotage and guerilla operations.
“The main INA presence was through the 1st Division and its three brigades. But at around 6,000 men, it had far fewer troops than equivalent Japanese or British formations.”[21] The INA also had a large number of civilian recruits that joined when Subhash Chandra Bose took over. The INA may have done more harm than good to the Japanese, since they were poorly equipped, armed, and trained for the terrain, as well as dependent on the Japanese for supplies and logistical assistance.
The Battle of Imphal can be described as a “hub-and-spoke”. The actual town of Imphal was the hub, while the routes leading to Imphal were the spokes of a sort of wheel.[22] The Southwest Theater of Imphal was in Tiddim, where a 164 mile road stretched from the Chin Hills of Burma to Imphal. Most of this road was mountainous, but as the road got closer to the Imphal Valley, the terrain became flat and abundant with paddy fields.
Major-General Cowan was the commander of the 17th Indian Division in the southwest, which had been deployed in that area in the year of 1943. “It had since established itself in the area: building defences, carrying out vigorous patrols and engaging in skirmishes with the Japanese.”[23] In March 1944, it became clear that the Japanese were going to invade India on the 15th. The plan called for the 17th Division to head up the Tiddim road in the north in order to be at the edge of the Imphal Valley.
“Yanagida’s division advanced in four columns. The left column, composed mostly of the 215th Regiment commanded by Colonel Sasahara, was supported by a battalion of mountain artillery and a detachment of engineers.”[24] The 215th crossed the hills in the south of Tiddim before heading north. It headed towards Milestones 109 and 110, because a supply depot lay in between them. Even though there were reports of the Japanese being sighted moving west of the Tiddim road, Scoones did not order Cowan to withdraw. Only after the Japanese were directly behind the 17th Indian Division did Scoones order the withdrawal.
This order led to the movement from Tiddim on March 14. “The 63rd Indian Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Burton, was at the front, while the 48th Indian Brigade, under the command of Brigadier Cameron, made up the rear.”[25] But, the Japanese had split the Tiddim Road in half, meaning that the 17th Indian Division would have to fight to reach Imphal. “To help Cowan, Scoones rushed to the Tiddim Road first one brigade - the 37th Indian Brigade - and then a second - the 49th Indian Brigade (from the Ukhrul Area) - from the 23rd
Indian Division.”[26] By March 15, the 37th Indian Brigade met the Japanese at around Milestone 100. The 37th Brigade was now fighting southwards on the Tiddim Road and the 17th Indian Division was fighting northwards.
The Japanese 214th Regiment around Tonzang and on the Tuitum Saddle that lay against the road was the first obstacle that the 17th had to get across. “On 16 March, ‘Hurribombers’ (Hawker Hurricane fighter-bombers) were called in to bomb and strafe the Tuitum Saddle. Heavy artillery bombardments came next, followed by an infantry attack. The Japanese position, exposed and devoid of overhead cover, was battered, and secured later that day.”[27] This meant that the 17th Division could cross the Manipur River, allowing them to leave behind a rearguard. This rearguard was assaulted constantly by the 214th Regiment.
“Farther north, the division had already bumped up against the next obstacle: the supply depot between Milestones 109 and 110. A battalion of the 215th Regiment had captured the depot on 18 March after only minor resistance. Some 2,700 administrative and support troops manning the depot had been evacuated just before the Japanese closed in.”[28] The 48th Indian Brigade was charged with the task of driving the Japanese out of the depot and the road. It send the Gurkha battalions: the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles and the 1/7th Gurkha Rifles. On March 23, the 2/5th Royal Gurkhas, well supported by guns and mortars, marched in with Tommy and Bren guns. This attack led to the capture of the ridge, and the Japanese withdrew.
The depot was could not be truly secured until after two positions overlooking the road were captured. The 1/7th Gurkhas led this attack, repeatedly attacking the Japanese bunkers, which were defended fiercely. However, on March 26th the Japanese retreated. “The entire depot area around Milestone 109 was secured. Whatever supplies that could be recovered and transported back to Imphal were now taken, while as many as possible that could be of potential value to the Japanese were destroyed.”[29] On that same day, the rearguard withdrew from the depot and blew up the Manipur Bridge.
In order to get to Imphal from the southeast, people had to take the Tamu-Palel Road. It was an all-weather road between India and Burma in 1944. “Tamu in the Kabaw Valley was the last village on the road on the Burma side of the border. Moreh was the first village on the Indian side; from here the road climbed sharply up the mountain range that ran along the frontier, to Tengnoupal village.”[30]
“The Yamamoto Force had set off northwards up the Kabaw Valley for Tamu at the same time as the other columns of the 33rd Division. Major-General Yamamoto commanded an infantry group formed around the 213th Regiment (less one battalion). Two more infantry battalions from the 15th Division were to join him. Importantly, he had in support the 14th Tank Regiment and most of a heavy field artillery regiment. Of the three Japanese forces advancing on Imphal, his had the most firepower and would be backed by the most direct route to the Chindwin River.”[31]
On March 26, a unit of Tamamoto Force capture Nippon Hill, but it was unable to advance any further. The 80th Indian Brigade was sent to deal with this, and before advancing, they heavily shelled Nippon Hill. Eventually, they captured the hill. This seems to be a pattern when dealing with Japanese defenses. Shelling and bombing were to happen first, and then an advance. But, the Japanese had “dug an extensive, deep network of underground tunnels and holes within their positions.”[32] These tunnels and holes “allowed them to withstand bombardments, while the small openings allowed for a sustained fire to be kept up on anyone who approached.”[33]
The Battles of Imphal and Kohima were the biggest defeats of the Japanese Army. “Although numbers vary, it is estimated that some 30,000 Japanese soldiers died and 23,000 were injured in this clash between their Fifteenth Army and the British Fourteenth Army.”[34]
Sources
- "Battles of Imphal and Kohima." National Army Museum. https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/battle-imphal.
- Katoch, Hemant Singh. Imphal 1944: The Japanese invasion of India. 1st ed. Oxford and New York: Osprey Publishing. 2018.
- "The Warring Sides." Manipur & WWII. https://www.battleofimphal.com/the-battle/the-warring-sides.
Footnotes
[1] Hemant Singh Katoch, Imphal 1944: The Japanese invasion of India, (New York, Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2018), 4.
[2] Ibid., 5
[3] Ibid., 21
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., 22
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid., 21
[9] “Battles of Imphal and Kohima”, National Army Museum, https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/battle-imphal.
[10] “The warring sides”, Battle of Imphal Tours, https://www.battleofimphal.com/the-battle/the-warring-sides.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Katoch, Imphal, 12.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid., 13.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid., 14.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid., 15.
[20] Ibid., 17.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid., 23.
[23] Ibid., 25.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid., 26
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid., 27.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid., 30.
[31] Ibid., 31.
[32] Ibid., 32.
[33] Ibid., 35.
[34] Ibid., 88