The Evolution of Strategic Bombing During World War I
by
Daniel
At the start of World War I, strategic bombing did not exist in its modern sense, as aviation was too primitive to have a significant impact on the overall outcome of the war, unless aircraft were used in conjunction with other weapons systems or fighting forces. Artillery spotting and photographic reconnaissance missions are examples of this.[1] In this paper, a strategic bombing raid will be defined as a bombing raid intended to disable or damage an industrial target, or a military target possessing high strategic value, such as an airbase or a shipyard.
Initially, only airships could exert any noticeable destructive effect on larger strategic targets, such as factories. This would soon change as long-range aircraft that were capable of carrying an significant bomb-load were in development and would begin to be fielded starting in 1916. These aircraft would begin to take over the role of strategic bombing, and by the start of 1917, bomber airplanes will have fully taken over the role of bomber, due to their superior survivability, speed, and handling.[2] By 1917, these bomber planes would be able to carry a load of over 2000 lbs. The challenge, however, lay in designing a reliable and accurate bombsight, which was still not fully achieved by World War II. Regardless of the primitive nature of airpower, fears of German bombing raids had been building in Britain and France for a little less than a decade. This fear was most prominently shown in British literature of the time, such as H.G. Wells’ The War in the Air.[3]
1914 - Beginnings
During the summer of 1914, Igor Sikorsky; an aviation pioneer, aircraft designer, and the future founder of Sikorsky Aircraft; flew an Ilya Muromets heavy bomber, a 98-foot wingspan, four-engine biplane, from Moscow to Kiev and back. This journey spanned 1,400 miles, and the craft stayed in the air for as much as eight hours at a time, a remarkable feat for the day.[4] Although this proved that heavier-than-air craft were capable of flying long-distance raids, the first bombing raids were conducted by individual German pilots in small, single-engine aircraft, terror-bombing cities relatively near their position, such as the bombing Luneville, France on August 3, 1914, and later bombing of Paris. A famous example of this was conducted by a German pilot named Hermann Dressler, who on August 29, 1914, flew his Etrich Taube around the Eiffel Tower, dropped a bomb, and then outran two French aircraft.[5] On August 30, 1914, a German Lieutenant by the name of Ferdinand von Hiddessen dropped a note while flying above Paris reading “The German Army stands before the gates of Paris. You have no choice but to surrender.”[6]
There were four bombing raids in 1914 that stand out for having a strategic impact. These four raids were conducted by the Royal Naval Air Service. The first two raids were on the Zeppelin sheds in Cologne and Dusseldorf Germany, on September 22 and October 8. The second of these raids destroyed the Zeppelin Z9 airship. The other two raids were both conducted on November 21, against the Zeppelin factory in Friedrichshafen, Germany and the Zeppelin shed in Ludwigshafen, Germany. All four of these raids were commanded by Charles Rumney Samson of the RNAS.[7] These raids destroyed a portion of Germany’s airship force, which showed the promise of strategic airpower in the near future.
1915 - Experimentation
In 1915, anti-aircraft guns and interceptor aircraft were being pushed into service in order to defend against airship raids and observation craft. The British achieved a powerful air defense by fielding large numbers of their QF 3-inch 20 cwt anti-aircraft gun, which possessed a vertical range of 18,000 feet. The French and Germans did not yet have dedicated anti-aircraft guns, and used their primary field guns, the 75mm and the 7.7cm modified to operate on a special anti-aircraft mounting.[8] Interceptor aircraft were used by both the Allies and the Central Powers in deterring and attacking opposing bombers, balloons, and observation planes, but were also used to intercept opposing interceptors. This spawned the role of the fighter aircraft, which would later be refined by pilots like Oswald Boelcke. Airships and balloons would become prime targets of interceptors and fighters, due to the volatile nature of the hydrogen gas they contained. Airships were especially vulnerable, as they were usually more than 400 feet long, with the fastest Zeppelins barely capable of reaching 65 mph (Figure 1).[9]
Fig. 1. Zeppelin L 30, http://zeppelin-museum.dk/D/german/historie/zeppelin/l30.jpg, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=37336547
The increasing number of threats from ground fire and enemy aircraft caused airships to lose the ability to effectively carry out their missions, leading to the adoption of large airplanes to fulfill the role of heavy bomber. While airplanes could not carry as much as airships, they were able to better execute the mission of aerial bombing due to their smaller size, greater speed, ability to overcome the wind, and superior survivability.[10]
1916 - Technological Growth
During 1916, many important bomber aircraft entered service. These new bombers offered the capability to effectively conduct bombing raids on strategic targets.[11] These bombers fell into two distinct categories; heavy bombers, such as the Handley Page O/100 (Figure 2);[12] and light bombers, such as the Airco DH.4 (Figure 3), which was currently being developed.[13] In 1916, air services began conducting night operations, which had reduced risk compared to daylight operations, as anti-aircraft weaponry is less effective in darkness, and enemy fighters are less effective at both navigating and identifying their target, in this case a bomber.[14] The O/100 entered service with the No. 3 Wing of the RNAS in November 1916, and used its impressive bomb-load of 2,000 lbs to damage and destroy German industrial centers, railroad stations, and U-boat bases.[15] The O/100 had a ceiling of 8,500 feet, and a maximum speed of 76 mph, which rendered it ineffective in a hostile environment, unless supplied with external protection, such as fighter support or darkness. The O/100 was armed with two Lewis guns which offered some protection against enemy fighters, but did not fully solve the issue of the O/100’s vulnerability, resulting in the O/100 becoming a night bomber.[16]
[Image pending permission for use]
Fig. 2. Handley Page O/100, 214th Squadron RAF
With the start of night bombing, many pilots had great difficulties flying at night. Many pilots who were excellent flyers during the day were completely disoriented at night.[17] As pilots learned to navigate by the stars, weather had a lesser effect on the pilot’s control of the craft. Eventually, bomber pilots were skilled enough to fly nearly as well in total darkness as they could in daylight.[18]
1917 and 1918 - Fully Operational
In 1917 and 1918, much of what was laid out in 1916 was put into play on a larger scale. The mass deployment of advanced light bombers is an example of this. Light bombers were meant to be maneuverable and fast so they could evade enemy fighters, while carrying a lighter load than that of heavy bombers as the price of this increased performance. The most successful of these light bombers was the Airco DH.4, which had maidened in 1916, was first delivered to the front in 1917, and by spring 1918, equipped nine RFC squadrons in addition to a number of RNAS squadrons.[19] The DH.4 was designed to be a high-speed, two-seat, day bomber. It would go on to have huge success in the roles of ground-attack aircraft, light bomber, and night-fighter. The British would use the DH.4’s speed as its protection when on raids, as a particular variant powered by a 375 hp Rolls-Royce Eagle could travel at 143 mph. The DH.4 was a highly versatile craft, and could carry up to 460 lbs of bombs, which allowed it to destroy or damage smaller targets, and attack targets where heavy bombers could not safely attack due to enemy fighter presence.
[Image pending permission for use]
Fig. 3. Airco DH.4, National Museum of The US Air Force
The heavy bomber comparable to the DH.4 was the Handley Page O/400. At a glance, the O/400 was nearly identical to the O/100. The most significant differences between the two types were that the O/400 was powered by a more powerful version of the Rolls-Royce Eagle and had four Lewis guns, instead of two like on the O/100.[20] By the summer of 1918, the O/400 equipped three RAF strategic bombing squadrons, and by the Armistice there would be 657 O/400s in service, with 550 of them serving in the European theater, equipping a total of 11 squadrons.[21] 1917 was also the year in which Germany launched eight daylight mass-attacks on England.[22] The first of these attacks occurred on May 25, 1917 and the final was on August 22, 1917. A total of 165 flights were involved, and 73,000 lbs of bombs were dropped, resulting in the death or injury of 1,364 English civilians, and £391,200 of damage.[23]
Foreshadowing the Battle of Britain
Due to the threat British anti-aircraft guns and interceptor aircraft posed to the German bombers, Germany halted its daylight bombing operations and began preparing to conduct its bombing raids under the cover of darkness.[24] On September 4, 1917, the first night-raid struck London. This raid had a great terror-effect on the British, as there had been no German bombing raids in nine weeks, and the raid had been the first night-raid launched against London.[25] This change in operations necessitated a rapid development of British anti-air defenses. Large wire screens suspended by balloons were raised in order to block enemy aircraft, no British aircraft were allowed to fly over the outer line of anti-aircraft guns or over London, and the anti-aircraft gunners were authorized to consider any aircraft within these zones hostile. Lieutenant Colonel Maximilian St Leger Simon, who held the position Anti-Aircraft Defence Commander, London, developed a new system of anti-aircraft barrage fire in which the anti-aircraft guns would create ‘curtains’ of shellfire.[26] These curtains were over 2,500 feet from top to bottom, and would target varying heights, which ranged from 5,000 to 17,000 feet. Each barrage was set to fire with a specified map reference. As an aircraft progressed across the map, the guns would begin firing with other, pre-coordinated reference points, in order to not allow the enemy aircraft to escape the ground fire by simply flying past it.[27] Once an enemy bomber was caught by the searchlights, the guns would cease barrage fire, and begin direct fire on the enemy bomber.[28] This new method of anti-aircraft barrage fire represented a significant development in air defense, and was one of the sources of the heavy German casualties on the Whitesun raid, which was the final German raid on London during the war.
On September 24, 1917, sixteen Gothas, a type of German heavy bomber, set off on the first of six night raids, which would take place over the course of eight days.[29] This period of time was later known as the Harvest Moon Offensive. Shortly after the bombers set out on their raid, three had to turn back. The remaining 13 Gothas crossed the English coastline scattered across the area between Orfordness and Dover. This large area meant the 30 RFC aircraft sent to intercept the bombers saw nothing. Only three of the German bombers attempted to reach London, as their targets were in Dover, south Essex, and north Kent. The three bombers that did continue toward London would see Britain’s new method of anti-aircraft barrage fire in action. This new method was put in to play, but failed to stop the three Gothas from flying over London and dropping 13 high-explosives and 19 incendiaries, which killed 14 and injured 49.[30] One of the Gothas crashed upon landing in Belgium, with damage from anti-aircraft fire as a possible cause.[31] Following the Harvest Moon Offensive, there was another increase in British defenses. In December of 1917, squadrons were equipped with high-performance fighters, such as the S.E.5a and Sopwith Camel, which were more than a match for any German bomber.[32] DH.4s would also begin to operate as night fighters, and made use of their two forward firing guns and rear gunner to attack German bombers from many angles. On May 20, 1918, British defenses succeeded in inflicting sufficient losses against the fifteenth and largest night raid on London, the Whitesun raid, to demonstrate that it would be no longer practical for the Germans to continue bombing London.[33]
Aftermath
Following the Armistice, airpower advocates such as Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell, would use the lessons from the war to provide an argument to build an air force consisting of bombers capable of carrying a reduced, but still large bomb-load, while simultaneously possessing enough armor and firepower to “ward off an enemy aerial attack”.[34] Until this mentality was proven flawed in World War II, many nations devoted little resources to building fighters, with the only reason the major european powers, had good fighters when World War II broke out was the aircraft firms making racing aircraft to win the Schneider Trophy.[35]
In spite of the ineffectiveness of strategic bombing in World War I, civilians were deeply shaken by the fact that they were now vulnerable to attack during war. This psychological effect outweighed the physical effect, as strategic bombing only managed to cause just over £3 million worth of damage in Britain over the course of the entire war. This can be put into perspective with the fact that during that period in history, rats in England would cause about £70 million in damage annually.[36] The terror effect of bombing in World War I would directly influence the direction of future bombing doctrine and campaigns.[37]
Sources
Footnotes
[1] Kennet, Lee. The First Air War. (New York: The Free Press, 1991). 41-62.
[2] Jackson, Robert. The Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft, (London: Parragon, 2009), 183.
[3] Kennet, Lee. The First Air War. (New York: The Free Press, 1991). 41-62.
[4] Ibid., 46.
[5] Morrow, John H., Jr. The Great War In The Air. (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993). 69.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid., 81.
[8] Banks, Arthur, A Military Atlas of the First World War. (South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books Limited, 2013). 233-234.
[9] Kennet, Lee. The First Air War. (New York: The Free Press, 1991). 41-62.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Jackson, Robert. The Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft, (London: Parragon, 2009), 183.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid., 15.
[14] Kennet, Lee. The First Air War. (New York: The Free Press, 1991). 41-62.
[15] Jackson, Robert. The Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft, (London: Parragon, 2009), 183.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Kennet, Lee. The First Air War. (New York: The Free Press, 1991). 41-62.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Jackson, Robert. The Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft, (London: Parragon, 2009), 15.
[20] Ibid., 183
[21] Ibid.
[22] Banks, Arthur, A Military Atlas of the First World War. (South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books Limited, 2013). 293.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Castle, Ian, London 1917-18: The bomber blitz, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing LTD, 2010), 36-37.
[25] Ibid., 36-42.
[26] Ibid., 42-44.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid., 44.
[30] Ibid., 45.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid., 64-65.
[33] Ibid., 89.
[34] Douhet, Giulio, The Command of the Air. (1921). 45.
[35] Jackson, Robert. The Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft, (London: Parragon, 2009), 348-349.
[36] Tucker, Spencer C, The European Powers in the First World War: An Encyclopedia. (London, Garland Publishing Inc., 1996). 18-19.
[37] Ibid.
Initially, only airships could exert any noticeable destructive effect on larger strategic targets, such as factories. This would soon change as long-range aircraft that were capable of carrying an significant bomb-load were in development and would begin to be fielded starting in 1916. These aircraft would begin to take over the role of strategic bombing, and by the start of 1917, bomber airplanes will have fully taken over the role of bomber, due to their superior survivability, speed, and handling.[2] By 1917, these bomber planes would be able to carry a load of over 2000 lbs. The challenge, however, lay in designing a reliable and accurate bombsight, which was still not fully achieved by World War II. Regardless of the primitive nature of airpower, fears of German bombing raids had been building in Britain and France for a little less than a decade. This fear was most prominently shown in British literature of the time, such as H.G. Wells’ The War in the Air.[3]
1914 - Beginnings
During the summer of 1914, Igor Sikorsky; an aviation pioneer, aircraft designer, and the future founder of Sikorsky Aircraft; flew an Ilya Muromets heavy bomber, a 98-foot wingspan, four-engine biplane, from Moscow to Kiev and back. This journey spanned 1,400 miles, and the craft stayed in the air for as much as eight hours at a time, a remarkable feat for the day.[4] Although this proved that heavier-than-air craft were capable of flying long-distance raids, the first bombing raids were conducted by individual German pilots in small, single-engine aircraft, terror-bombing cities relatively near their position, such as the bombing Luneville, France on August 3, 1914, and later bombing of Paris. A famous example of this was conducted by a German pilot named Hermann Dressler, who on August 29, 1914, flew his Etrich Taube around the Eiffel Tower, dropped a bomb, and then outran two French aircraft.[5] On August 30, 1914, a German Lieutenant by the name of Ferdinand von Hiddessen dropped a note while flying above Paris reading “The German Army stands before the gates of Paris. You have no choice but to surrender.”[6]
There were four bombing raids in 1914 that stand out for having a strategic impact. These four raids were conducted by the Royal Naval Air Service. The first two raids were on the Zeppelin sheds in Cologne and Dusseldorf Germany, on September 22 and October 8. The second of these raids destroyed the Zeppelin Z9 airship. The other two raids were both conducted on November 21, against the Zeppelin factory in Friedrichshafen, Germany and the Zeppelin shed in Ludwigshafen, Germany. All four of these raids were commanded by Charles Rumney Samson of the RNAS.[7] These raids destroyed a portion of Germany’s airship force, which showed the promise of strategic airpower in the near future.
1915 - Experimentation
In 1915, anti-aircraft guns and interceptor aircraft were being pushed into service in order to defend against airship raids and observation craft. The British achieved a powerful air defense by fielding large numbers of their QF 3-inch 20 cwt anti-aircraft gun, which possessed a vertical range of 18,000 feet. The French and Germans did not yet have dedicated anti-aircraft guns, and used their primary field guns, the 75mm and the 7.7cm modified to operate on a special anti-aircraft mounting.[8] Interceptor aircraft were used by both the Allies and the Central Powers in deterring and attacking opposing bombers, balloons, and observation planes, but were also used to intercept opposing interceptors. This spawned the role of the fighter aircraft, which would later be refined by pilots like Oswald Boelcke. Airships and balloons would become prime targets of interceptors and fighters, due to the volatile nature of the hydrogen gas they contained. Airships were especially vulnerable, as they were usually more than 400 feet long, with the fastest Zeppelins barely capable of reaching 65 mph (Figure 1).[9]
Fig. 1. Zeppelin L 30, http://zeppelin-museum.dk/D/german/historie/zeppelin/l30.jpg, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=37336547
The increasing number of threats from ground fire and enemy aircraft caused airships to lose the ability to effectively carry out their missions, leading to the adoption of large airplanes to fulfill the role of heavy bomber. While airplanes could not carry as much as airships, they were able to better execute the mission of aerial bombing due to their smaller size, greater speed, ability to overcome the wind, and superior survivability.[10]
1916 - Technological Growth
During 1916, many important bomber aircraft entered service. These new bombers offered the capability to effectively conduct bombing raids on strategic targets.[11] These bombers fell into two distinct categories; heavy bombers, such as the Handley Page O/100 (Figure 2);[12] and light bombers, such as the Airco DH.4 (Figure 3), which was currently being developed.[13] In 1916, air services began conducting night operations, which had reduced risk compared to daylight operations, as anti-aircraft weaponry is less effective in darkness, and enemy fighters are less effective at both navigating and identifying their target, in this case a bomber.[14] The O/100 entered service with the No. 3 Wing of the RNAS in November 1916, and used its impressive bomb-load of 2,000 lbs to damage and destroy German industrial centers, railroad stations, and U-boat bases.[15] The O/100 had a ceiling of 8,500 feet, and a maximum speed of 76 mph, which rendered it ineffective in a hostile environment, unless supplied with external protection, such as fighter support or darkness. The O/100 was armed with two Lewis guns which offered some protection against enemy fighters, but did not fully solve the issue of the O/100’s vulnerability, resulting in the O/100 becoming a night bomber.[16]
[Image pending permission for use]
Fig. 2. Handley Page O/100, 214th Squadron RAF
With the start of night bombing, many pilots had great difficulties flying at night. Many pilots who were excellent flyers during the day were completely disoriented at night.[17] As pilots learned to navigate by the stars, weather had a lesser effect on the pilot’s control of the craft. Eventually, bomber pilots were skilled enough to fly nearly as well in total darkness as they could in daylight.[18]
1917 and 1918 - Fully Operational
In 1917 and 1918, much of what was laid out in 1916 was put into play on a larger scale. The mass deployment of advanced light bombers is an example of this. Light bombers were meant to be maneuverable and fast so they could evade enemy fighters, while carrying a lighter load than that of heavy bombers as the price of this increased performance. The most successful of these light bombers was the Airco DH.4, which had maidened in 1916, was first delivered to the front in 1917, and by spring 1918, equipped nine RFC squadrons in addition to a number of RNAS squadrons.[19] The DH.4 was designed to be a high-speed, two-seat, day bomber. It would go on to have huge success in the roles of ground-attack aircraft, light bomber, and night-fighter. The British would use the DH.4’s speed as its protection when on raids, as a particular variant powered by a 375 hp Rolls-Royce Eagle could travel at 143 mph. The DH.4 was a highly versatile craft, and could carry up to 460 lbs of bombs, which allowed it to destroy or damage smaller targets, and attack targets where heavy bombers could not safely attack due to enemy fighter presence.
[Image pending permission for use]
Fig. 3. Airco DH.4, National Museum of The US Air Force
The heavy bomber comparable to the DH.4 was the Handley Page O/400. At a glance, the O/400 was nearly identical to the O/100. The most significant differences between the two types were that the O/400 was powered by a more powerful version of the Rolls-Royce Eagle and had four Lewis guns, instead of two like on the O/100.[20] By the summer of 1918, the O/400 equipped three RAF strategic bombing squadrons, and by the Armistice there would be 657 O/400s in service, with 550 of them serving in the European theater, equipping a total of 11 squadrons.[21] 1917 was also the year in which Germany launched eight daylight mass-attacks on England.[22] The first of these attacks occurred on May 25, 1917 and the final was on August 22, 1917. A total of 165 flights were involved, and 73,000 lbs of bombs were dropped, resulting in the death or injury of 1,364 English civilians, and £391,200 of damage.[23]
Foreshadowing the Battle of Britain
Due to the threat British anti-aircraft guns and interceptor aircraft posed to the German bombers, Germany halted its daylight bombing operations and began preparing to conduct its bombing raids under the cover of darkness.[24] On September 4, 1917, the first night-raid struck London. This raid had a great terror-effect on the British, as there had been no German bombing raids in nine weeks, and the raid had been the first night-raid launched against London.[25] This change in operations necessitated a rapid development of British anti-air defenses. Large wire screens suspended by balloons were raised in order to block enemy aircraft, no British aircraft were allowed to fly over the outer line of anti-aircraft guns or over London, and the anti-aircraft gunners were authorized to consider any aircraft within these zones hostile. Lieutenant Colonel Maximilian St Leger Simon, who held the position Anti-Aircraft Defence Commander, London, developed a new system of anti-aircraft barrage fire in which the anti-aircraft guns would create ‘curtains’ of shellfire.[26] These curtains were over 2,500 feet from top to bottom, and would target varying heights, which ranged from 5,000 to 17,000 feet. Each barrage was set to fire with a specified map reference. As an aircraft progressed across the map, the guns would begin firing with other, pre-coordinated reference points, in order to not allow the enemy aircraft to escape the ground fire by simply flying past it.[27] Once an enemy bomber was caught by the searchlights, the guns would cease barrage fire, and begin direct fire on the enemy bomber.[28] This new method of anti-aircraft barrage fire represented a significant development in air defense, and was one of the sources of the heavy German casualties on the Whitesun raid, which was the final German raid on London during the war.
On September 24, 1917, sixteen Gothas, a type of German heavy bomber, set off on the first of six night raids, which would take place over the course of eight days.[29] This period of time was later known as the Harvest Moon Offensive. Shortly after the bombers set out on their raid, three had to turn back. The remaining 13 Gothas crossed the English coastline scattered across the area between Orfordness and Dover. This large area meant the 30 RFC aircraft sent to intercept the bombers saw nothing. Only three of the German bombers attempted to reach London, as their targets were in Dover, south Essex, and north Kent. The three bombers that did continue toward London would see Britain’s new method of anti-aircraft barrage fire in action. This new method was put in to play, but failed to stop the three Gothas from flying over London and dropping 13 high-explosives and 19 incendiaries, which killed 14 and injured 49.[30] One of the Gothas crashed upon landing in Belgium, with damage from anti-aircraft fire as a possible cause.[31] Following the Harvest Moon Offensive, there was another increase in British defenses. In December of 1917, squadrons were equipped with high-performance fighters, such as the S.E.5a and Sopwith Camel, which were more than a match for any German bomber.[32] DH.4s would also begin to operate as night fighters, and made use of their two forward firing guns and rear gunner to attack German bombers from many angles. On May 20, 1918, British defenses succeeded in inflicting sufficient losses against the fifteenth and largest night raid on London, the Whitesun raid, to demonstrate that it would be no longer practical for the Germans to continue bombing London.[33]
Aftermath
Following the Armistice, airpower advocates such as Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell, would use the lessons from the war to provide an argument to build an air force consisting of bombers capable of carrying a reduced, but still large bomb-load, while simultaneously possessing enough armor and firepower to “ward off an enemy aerial attack”.[34] Until this mentality was proven flawed in World War II, many nations devoted little resources to building fighters, with the only reason the major european powers, had good fighters when World War II broke out was the aircraft firms making racing aircraft to win the Schneider Trophy.[35]
In spite of the ineffectiveness of strategic bombing in World War I, civilians were deeply shaken by the fact that they were now vulnerable to attack during war. This psychological effect outweighed the physical effect, as strategic bombing only managed to cause just over £3 million worth of damage in Britain over the course of the entire war. This can be put into perspective with the fact that during that period in history, rats in England would cause about £70 million in damage annually.[36] The terror effect of bombing in World War I would directly influence the direction of future bombing doctrine and campaigns.[37]
Sources
- Banks, Arthur, A Military Atlas of the First World War. South Yorkshire, Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books Limited, 2013.
- Castle, Ian, London 1917-18: The bomber blitz, Oxford: Osprey Publishing LTD, 2010.
- Douhet, Giulio, The Command of the Air. 1921.
- Jackson, Robert. The Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft, London: Parragon, 2009.
- Kennet, Lee. The First Air War. New York: The Free Press, 1991.
- Morrow, John H., Jr. The Great War In The Air. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993.
- Tucker, Spencer C, The European Powers in the First World War: An Encyclopedia. London, Garland Publishing Inc, 1996.
Footnotes
[1] Kennet, Lee. The First Air War. (New York: The Free Press, 1991). 41-62.
[2] Jackson, Robert. The Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft, (London: Parragon, 2009), 183.
[3] Kennet, Lee. The First Air War. (New York: The Free Press, 1991). 41-62.
[4] Ibid., 46.
[5] Morrow, John H., Jr. The Great War In The Air. (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993). 69.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid., 81.
[8] Banks, Arthur, A Military Atlas of the First World War. (South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books Limited, 2013). 233-234.
[9] Kennet, Lee. The First Air War. (New York: The Free Press, 1991). 41-62.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Jackson, Robert. The Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft, (London: Parragon, 2009), 183.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid., 15.
[14] Kennet, Lee. The First Air War. (New York: The Free Press, 1991). 41-62.
[15] Jackson, Robert. The Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft, (London: Parragon, 2009), 183.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Kennet, Lee. The First Air War. (New York: The Free Press, 1991). 41-62.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Jackson, Robert. The Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft, (London: Parragon, 2009), 15.
[20] Ibid., 183
[21] Ibid.
[22] Banks, Arthur, A Military Atlas of the First World War. (South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books Limited, 2013). 293.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Castle, Ian, London 1917-18: The bomber blitz, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing LTD, 2010), 36-37.
[25] Ibid., 36-42.
[26] Ibid., 42-44.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid., 44.
[30] Ibid., 45.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid., 64-65.
[33] Ibid., 89.
[34] Douhet, Giulio, The Command of the Air. (1921). 45.
[35] Jackson, Robert. The Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft, (London: Parragon, 2009), 348-349.
[36] Tucker, Spencer C, The European Powers in the First World War: An Encyclopedia. (London, Garland Publishing Inc., 1996). 18-19.
[37] Ibid.