An Analysis of Sun Tzu’s Art of War and The Nine Principles of War in Relation to the 1940 Invasion of France
by
Ardil
I: Sun Tzu’s Art of War
Calculations: Sun Tzu recommended deception of the enemy, saying that “war is the way of deception.”[1] In their northern offensive, the Germans used “most of their airborne forces to seize key bridges leading into ‘Fortress Holland’ and speed the panzers’ advance,” as well as “shaped charges and flamethrowers as well as infantry weapons”[2] to destroy Fort Eben-Emael, whose “swift fall… convinced the French that their assessment of the German operational intentions was correct.”[3] (That is, that the Germans would attempt an invasion quite similar to that of World War I.) This prompted them to continue with the Dyle plan, in which Allied forces rushed to defensive positions near the river Dyle. Meanwhile, the panzer corps commanded by Hoth, Reinhardt, and Guderian advanced through the Ardennes,[4] cutting off the supplies to the advancing Allied troops. The entire plan hinged upon the deceit of making the French believe that this was, in effect, a second Schlieffen plan, while using an attack through the Ardennes to cripple the responding forces.
Starting A Battle: Sun Tzu advised taking supplies from the enemy,[5] which was done by Army Group A. Because the positions they were attacking “were not held by first-line troops,”[6] “hundreds upon hundreds … surrendered at [the Germans’] arrival. In two days, Rommel’s division captured 10,000 soldiers, 100 tanks, 30 armored cars, and 27 guns.”[7] Later, Rommel noted that his troops “had no time to collect large numbers of prisoners and equipment.”[8] Sun Tzu also advocated a swift and decisive war, rather than a drawn-out one. The Germans’ plans and techniques made for an extremely swift invasion, taking just over six weeks in total.
Planning An Attack: Sun Tzu said that keeping the enemy’s army intact is the best course of action, the second best being to destroy it.[9] Using their new tactics, the panzer units would split an army into pieces, each of which could be dealt with separately by the infantry at a later point. An observer described the split forces as “a mere sum of organs whose unity has been destroyed,”[10] also noting that “an army, if it is to be effective, must be something [greater] than a numerical sum of its soldiers.”[11] Sun Tzu also encouraged frequent communication between an army’s upper and lower ranks.[12] The French failed in this respect, with Gamelin’s headquarters staying “largely unaware of the looming threat. [It] summed up its impression by noting ‘[overall] impression very good.’”[13]
Form: Sun Tzu advised fighting easy battles and making calculations before combat.[14] The German plan was such that they did not need to fight the best of the Allied troops; only to cut off their supplies. In that, the Germans chose to win an easy battle, but their victory toppled the northern Allied defense.
Circumstance: Sun Tzu encouraged using irregular tactics and baiting the enemy.[15] The panzer tactics were irregular and new, while the entire northern offensive was effectively baiting the French into using the Dyle plan.
The Empty And The Solid: Sun Tzu recommended going through terrain that the enemy does not defend, and having a mobile center of mass among the forces.[16] The principles of Bewegungskrieg dictate that a mobile troop center, the position of which must depend on the circumstances, is vital for success. The Germans also sent their most mechanized force through the Ardennes - a forested area with little defense compared to its neighbors.[17]
Armies Contending: Sun Tzu counseled against attacking an army that has the advantage, saying that it is better to find a roundabout way to strike at it.[18] Instead of attacking the northern French forces directly, the Germans cut them off from supplies - a way of striking at the indirectly.
Nine Variations: Sun Tzu said that a good leader ignores some of his ruler’s commands, depending on the circumstances.[19] Guderian, when ordered by high command to halt his forces, “resigned on the spot,”[20] but quickly “resumed his drive west; he simply strung signal lines behind to [his] headquarters, to mislead his superiors about his location.”[21]
The Army On The Move: Sun Tzu advised that, when crossing a river, it is best to get some distance from it.[22] Guderian, after crossing the Meuse, continued on for 55 miles before he received a second order to stop.[23]
Forms Of Terrain: Sun Tzu said that a leader who does not seek fame or shrink from blame is a treasure.[24] Guderian was “irascible and truculent,”[25] and he ignored some orders given to him by high command, and did not shrink from the blame, instead relying on the German’s leniency towards “talented officers, no matter how truculent their behavior.”[26]
Nine Terrains: Sun Tzu advocated rushing into whichever opportunities happen to present themselves.[27] The Ardennes forest was, in effect, an opening in the French defense, which the German panzers quickly exploited.
Attack With Fire: Sun Tzu advised fire as an intelligent assistance to attack.[28] The Germans used flamethrowers throughout the campaign. A notable use was in their to attack on Fort Eben-Emael, when, using flamethrowers, they “had blinded and choked the defenders and knocked the fort out of action.”[29]
Using Spies
Sun Tzu recommended using spies and intelligence to the maximum extent possible.[30] When the initial German invasion plans - “essentially an imitation of the famous Schlieffen Plan”[31] - “fell into Belgian hands”[32] due to “an accidental landing on Belgian territory,”[33] the Germans were forced to reconsider their plans, which eventually led conclusion that “the main weight of [the] attack must lie with Army Group A.”[34]
II: The Nine Principles of War
Mass: The strike through the Ardennes used panzer units in high concentration,[35] constituting a proper use of mass. This resulted in the defending French forces being split apart, to be dealt with by the infantry at a later time.
Objective: At their initial attack, the Germans seemed to have a clear objective, but the fact that they did not attack Dunkirk at first suggests that perhaps their intentions were not as clear as they appeared.[36] The failure to attack led to the Dunkirk evacuation being possible, meaning that hundreds of thousands of troops could be evacuated.[37]
Offensive: The Germans were best at seizing and holding the initiative. The French doctrine “lacked flexibility and the capacity to respond quickly,”[38] while Bewegungskrieg was based on speed and response.
Security: Security results from one’s knowledge of the enemy and the enemy’s plans, or rather, greater knowledge of the enemy than the enemy has of oneself. The Germans had greater security because the French did not know their full plans, and were instead deceived into thinking that the Germans planned to use a second Schlieffen plan.
Economy of Force: The German strategy used a small percentage of their divisions to do most of the work, with the panzer units bearing “the brunt of the fighting, as well as the losses.”[39] This left the infantry mostly free to take care of the bubbles of resistance that the panzers left behind.
Maneuver: The speed with which the Germans would move was unexpected to the French.[40] They suspected that the panzers would be reliant on constant infantry support, and would not be able to cross the Meuse on their own.[41] In reality, the panzers were able to bridge the Meuse, partially because they found a lock “that the French had failed to either blow up or to defend.”[42]
Unity of Command: The coordination of the northern and Ardennes offensives show brilliant unity of command, but the disorganization in the initial attacks on Dunkirk was partly the fault of insufficient unity of command. Only after the British had four days[43] to evacuate did the Germans “rationalize the command structure and place operations against the perimeter under the Eighteenth Army.”[44]
Surprise: Surprise figured significantly into the German strategy. The Ardennes offensive would have been far less effective had it not been a surprise to the Allies. The deception that figured into the northern offensive assisted the surprise greatly.[45]
Simplicity: The German plan was simple yet effective. It was unexpected by the French, and their failure to prepare for a strike through the Ardennes led to their eventual defeat.
Conclusion
I would choose to use Sun Tzu’s Art of War because it is much more specific, whereas the Nine Principles of War are rather ambiguous. The latter gives neither specific examples nor advice as to the proper and improper application of each principle. Sun Tzu provides real examples and powerful comparisons, although the text is rather archaic and could benefit from being revised to use more modern language. A new text could be devised that applied the principles from Sun Tzu to modern weapons and technology, such as aircraft or cyberweapons.
Sources
Footnotes
[1] Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2018), 48.
[2] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, 1937-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 69.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Tzu, The Art Of War, 51.
[6] Murray, A War to Be Won, 72.
[7] Ibid., 71.
[8] Ibid., 72.
[9] Tzu, The Art Of War, 53.
[10] Murray, A War to Be Won, 76.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Tzu, The Art Of War, 55.
[13] Murray, A War to Be Won, 74.
[14] Tzu, The Art Of War, 57.
[15] Tzu, The Art Of War, 60.
[16] Ibid., 62.
[17] Murray, A War to Be Won, 70.
[18] Tzu, The Art Of War, 67.
[19] Ibid., 70.
[20] Murray, A War to Be Won, 75.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Tzu, The Art Of War, 73.
[23] Murray, A War to Be Won, 75.
[24] Tzu, The Art Of War, 80-81.
[25] Murray, A War to Be Won, 72.
[26] Ibid., 75.
[27] Tzu, The Art Of War, 88.
[28] Ibid., 91.
[29] Murray, A War to Be Won, 69.
[30] Tzu, The Art Of War, 95.
[31] Erich Von Manstein, Lost Victories (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004), 57, accessed February 24, 2019, https://archive.org/details/ErichVonMansteinLostVictories/page/n55.
[32] Ibid., 70. https://archive.org/details/ErichVonMansteinLostVictories/page/n69.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid., 60. https://archive.org/details/ErichVonMansteinLostVictories/page/n59
[35] Murray, A War to Be Won, 71.
[36] Ibid., 78.
[37] Ibid., 80.
[38] Ibid., 61.
[39] Ibid., 78.
[40] Ibid., 61.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid., 71.
[43] Initial evacuations, May 26. Source: Ibid., 79. Germans act, May 30. Source: Ibid., 80.
[44] Ibid., 80.
[45] Ibid., 69.
Calculations: Sun Tzu recommended deception of the enemy, saying that “war is the way of deception.”[1] In their northern offensive, the Germans used “most of their airborne forces to seize key bridges leading into ‘Fortress Holland’ and speed the panzers’ advance,” as well as “shaped charges and flamethrowers as well as infantry weapons”[2] to destroy Fort Eben-Emael, whose “swift fall… convinced the French that their assessment of the German operational intentions was correct.”[3] (That is, that the Germans would attempt an invasion quite similar to that of World War I.) This prompted them to continue with the Dyle plan, in which Allied forces rushed to defensive positions near the river Dyle. Meanwhile, the panzer corps commanded by Hoth, Reinhardt, and Guderian advanced through the Ardennes,[4] cutting off the supplies to the advancing Allied troops. The entire plan hinged upon the deceit of making the French believe that this was, in effect, a second Schlieffen plan, while using an attack through the Ardennes to cripple the responding forces.
Starting A Battle: Sun Tzu advised taking supplies from the enemy,[5] which was done by Army Group A. Because the positions they were attacking “were not held by first-line troops,”[6] “hundreds upon hundreds … surrendered at [the Germans’] arrival. In two days, Rommel’s division captured 10,000 soldiers, 100 tanks, 30 armored cars, and 27 guns.”[7] Later, Rommel noted that his troops “had no time to collect large numbers of prisoners and equipment.”[8] Sun Tzu also advocated a swift and decisive war, rather than a drawn-out one. The Germans’ plans and techniques made for an extremely swift invasion, taking just over six weeks in total.
Planning An Attack: Sun Tzu said that keeping the enemy’s army intact is the best course of action, the second best being to destroy it.[9] Using their new tactics, the panzer units would split an army into pieces, each of which could be dealt with separately by the infantry at a later point. An observer described the split forces as “a mere sum of organs whose unity has been destroyed,”[10] also noting that “an army, if it is to be effective, must be something [greater] than a numerical sum of its soldiers.”[11] Sun Tzu also encouraged frequent communication between an army’s upper and lower ranks.[12] The French failed in this respect, with Gamelin’s headquarters staying “largely unaware of the looming threat. [It] summed up its impression by noting ‘[overall] impression very good.’”[13]
Form: Sun Tzu advised fighting easy battles and making calculations before combat.[14] The German plan was such that they did not need to fight the best of the Allied troops; only to cut off their supplies. In that, the Germans chose to win an easy battle, but their victory toppled the northern Allied defense.
Circumstance: Sun Tzu encouraged using irregular tactics and baiting the enemy.[15] The panzer tactics were irregular and new, while the entire northern offensive was effectively baiting the French into using the Dyle plan.
The Empty And The Solid: Sun Tzu recommended going through terrain that the enemy does not defend, and having a mobile center of mass among the forces.[16] The principles of Bewegungskrieg dictate that a mobile troop center, the position of which must depend on the circumstances, is vital for success. The Germans also sent their most mechanized force through the Ardennes - a forested area with little defense compared to its neighbors.[17]
Armies Contending: Sun Tzu counseled against attacking an army that has the advantage, saying that it is better to find a roundabout way to strike at it.[18] Instead of attacking the northern French forces directly, the Germans cut them off from supplies - a way of striking at the indirectly.
Nine Variations: Sun Tzu said that a good leader ignores some of his ruler’s commands, depending on the circumstances.[19] Guderian, when ordered by high command to halt his forces, “resigned on the spot,”[20] but quickly “resumed his drive west; he simply strung signal lines behind to [his] headquarters, to mislead his superiors about his location.”[21]
The Army On The Move: Sun Tzu advised that, when crossing a river, it is best to get some distance from it.[22] Guderian, after crossing the Meuse, continued on for 55 miles before he received a second order to stop.[23]
Forms Of Terrain: Sun Tzu said that a leader who does not seek fame or shrink from blame is a treasure.[24] Guderian was “irascible and truculent,”[25] and he ignored some orders given to him by high command, and did not shrink from the blame, instead relying on the German’s leniency towards “talented officers, no matter how truculent their behavior.”[26]
Nine Terrains: Sun Tzu advocated rushing into whichever opportunities happen to present themselves.[27] The Ardennes forest was, in effect, an opening in the French defense, which the German panzers quickly exploited.
Attack With Fire: Sun Tzu advised fire as an intelligent assistance to attack.[28] The Germans used flamethrowers throughout the campaign. A notable use was in their to attack on Fort Eben-Emael, when, using flamethrowers, they “had blinded and choked the defenders and knocked the fort out of action.”[29]
Using Spies
Sun Tzu recommended using spies and intelligence to the maximum extent possible.[30] When the initial German invasion plans - “essentially an imitation of the famous Schlieffen Plan”[31] - “fell into Belgian hands”[32] due to “an accidental landing on Belgian territory,”[33] the Germans were forced to reconsider their plans, which eventually led conclusion that “the main weight of [the] attack must lie with Army Group A.”[34]
II: The Nine Principles of War
Mass: The strike through the Ardennes used panzer units in high concentration,[35] constituting a proper use of mass. This resulted in the defending French forces being split apart, to be dealt with by the infantry at a later time.
Objective: At their initial attack, the Germans seemed to have a clear objective, but the fact that they did not attack Dunkirk at first suggests that perhaps their intentions were not as clear as they appeared.[36] The failure to attack led to the Dunkirk evacuation being possible, meaning that hundreds of thousands of troops could be evacuated.[37]
Offensive: The Germans were best at seizing and holding the initiative. The French doctrine “lacked flexibility and the capacity to respond quickly,”[38] while Bewegungskrieg was based on speed and response.
Security: Security results from one’s knowledge of the enemy and the enemy’s plans, or rather, greater knowledge of the enemy than the enemy has of oneself. The Germans had greater security because the French did not know their full plans, and were instead deceived into thinking that the Germans planned to use a second Schlieffen plan.
Economy of Force: The German strategy used a small percentage of their divisions to do most of the work, with the panzer units bearing “the brunt of the fighting, as well as the losses.”[39] This left the infantry mostly free to take care of the bubbles of resistance that the panzers left behind.
Maneuver: The speed with which the Germans would move was unexpected to the French.[40] They suspected that the panzers would be reliant on constant infantry support, and would not be able to cross the Meuse on their own.[41] In reality, the panzers were able to bridge the Meuse, partially because they found a lock “that the French had failed to either blow up or to defend.”[42]
Unity of Command: The coordination of the northern and Ardennes offensives show brilliant unity of command, but the disorganization in the initial attacks on Dunkirk was partly the fault of insufficient unity of command. Only after the British had four days[43] to evacuate did the Germans “rationalize the command structure and place operations against the perimeter under the Eighteenth Army.”[44]
Surprise: Surprise figured significantly into the German strategy. The Ardennes offensive would have been far less effective had it not been a surprise to the Allies. The deception that figured into the northern offensive assisted the surprise greatly.[45]
Simplicity: The German plan was simple yet effective. It was unexpected by the French, and their failure to prepare for a strike through the Ardennes led to their eventual defeat.
Conclusion
I would choose to use Sun Tzu’s Art of War because it is much more specific, whereas the Nine Principles of War are rather ambiguous. The latter gives neither specific examples nor advice as to the proper and improper application of each principle. Sun Tzu provides real examples and powerful comparisons, although the text is rather archaic and could benefit from being revised to use more modern language. A new text could be devised that applied the principles from Sun Tzu to modern weapons and technology, such as aircraft or cyberweapons.
Sources
- Manstein, Erich Von. Lost Victories. St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004. Accessed February 24, 2019. https://archive.org/details/ErichVonMansteinLostVictories/.
- Murray, Williamson, and Allan R. Millett. A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, 1937-1945. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009.
- Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Translated by Peter Harris. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2018.
Footnotes
[1] Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Peter Harris (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2018), 48.
[2] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, 1937-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 69.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Tzu, The Art Of War, 51.
[6] Murray, A War to Be Won, 72.
[7] Ibid., 71.
[8] Ibid., 72.
[9] Tzu, The Art Of War, 53.
[10] Murray, A War to Be Won, 76.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Tzu, The Art Of War, 55.
[13] Murray, A War to Be Won, 74.
[14] Tzu, The Art Of War, 57.
[15] Tzu, The Art Of War, 60.
[16] Ibid., 62.
[17] Murray, A War to Be Won, 70.
[18] Tzu, The Art Of War, 67.
[19] Ibid., 70.
[20] Murray, A War to Be Won, 75.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Tzu, The Art Of War, 73.
[23] Murray, A War to Be Won, 75.
[24] Tzu, The Art Of War, 80-81.
[25] Murray, A War to Be Won, 72.
[26] Ibid., 75.
[27] Tzu, The Art Of War, 88.
[28] Ibid., 91.
[29] Murray, A War to Be Won, 69.
[30] Tzu, The Art Of War, 95.
[31] Erich Von Manstein, Lost Victories (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004), 57, accessed February 24, 2019, https://archive.org/details/ErichVonMansteinLostVictories/page/n55.
[32] Ibid., 70. https://archive.org/details/ErichVonMansteinLostVictories/page/n69.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid., 60. https://archive.org/details/ErichVonMansteinLostVictories/page/n59
[35] Murray, A War to Be Won, 71.
[36] Ibid., 78.
[37] Ibid., 80.
[38] Ibid., 61.
[39] Ibid., 78.
[40] Ibid., 61.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid., 71.
[43] Initial evacuations, May 26. Source: Ibid., 79. Germans act, May 30. Source: Ibid., 80.
[44] Ibid., 80.
[45] Ibid., 69.
- Murray, Williamson, and Allan R. Millett. A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, 1937-1945. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009.